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BEYOND RESIDENTIAL SEGREGATION: THE




Several years ago, I was a client of Georgia Vocational
Rehabilitation... at [Atlanta Rehabilitation Center]. I was put
in a sheltered workshop and asked to put a plastic cover on two
bottles, eight hours a day, for three weeks to show my readiness
to work. I balked and the counselor said, "Oh, so you don't really
want to work. I had two other Ph.Ds who didn't want to work."'
In the decade since the Supreme Court interpreted the scope of the
Americans with Disabilities Act's (ADA) integration mandate in
Olmstead v. L. C.,2 litigation about integration has been brought
primarily to ensure that institutionalized people with psychiatric and
developmental disabilities can live in their own homes in community
settings.3  Expansion of Olmstead beyond the gates of state
institutions has focused for the most part on its application to other
congregate settings such as nursing homes 4 and, most recently, large
* This article would not have been possible without the outstanding work and assistance of Gwen
Russell, Boston University Law School Class of 2011. 1 am grateful for the vision and insights of Robert
Pledl, the first attorney to challenge sheltered workshops under Olmstead. As usual, the legal analysis
and impatient hectoring of Ira Burnim of the Bazelon Center for Mental Health Law improved my
thinking, as did more gentle discussions with Jennifer Mathis, also of the Bazelon Center. Debates with
Steven Schwartz, Bob Fleischner, Cathy Costanzo, and Pat Rea at the Center for Public Representation
helped to sharpen the issues addressed here. None of the work that I do would be possible without the
(flexible) support of my husband, Wes Daniels, and my best friend, Jamie Elmer. This article is
dedicated to the memory of my mother, Gabrielle Stefan.
i. Interview with Kent Earnhardt, Sheltered Workshop Services Consumer (Oct. 24, 2009).
2. Olmstead v. L.C., 527 U.S. 581 (1999).
3. E.g., Frederick L. v. Dep't of Pub. Welfare, 422 F.3d 151 (3d Cir. 2005); Messier v. Southbury
Training Sch., 562 F. Supp. 2d 294 (D. Conn. 2008); Williams v. Wasserman, 164 F. Supp. 2d 591 (D.
Md. 2001); Martin v. Taft, 222 F. Supp. 2d 940 (S.D. Ohio 2002).
4. See generally Ligas v. Maram, 478 F.3d 771 (7th Cir. 2007) (denying motion to intervene);
Rolland v. Celluci, 52 F. Supp. 2d 231 (D. Mass. 1999); Joseph S. v. Hogan, 561 F. Supp. 2d 280
(E.D.N.Y. 2008).
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congregate settings that purport to be community-based but function
as institutions. 5 In addition, advocates have used Olmstead to
challenge waiting lists and state Medicaid regulations or policies,
including state budget cuts, which effectively force disabled citizens
living in the community to move to institutions to get the medical
services that they need.6
Litigation seeking to apply Olmstead's integration requirement to
other contexts has been sparse. A few cases have been brought citing
7.the ADA's integration mandate in areas such as voting, insurance
coverage, 8 reduction in services, 9 communication issues, including
interpreter services1°  and facilitated communication,' I  and even
interpretation of a contract.'
2
Only one case has been brought directly challenging sheltered
workshops as unnecessary segregation in employment services under
the integration mandate, 13 although Olmstead and the integration
mandate have been raised in another case challenging sheltered
workshops' exemptions from unemployment compensation. 14
5. See generally Disability Advocates, Inc. v. Paterson (DAI 1), 598 F. Supp. 2d 289 (E.D.N.Y.
2009); Disability Advocates, Inc. v. Paterson (DAI1), 653 F. Supp. 2d 184 (E.D.N.Y. 2009); Disability
Advocates Inc. v. Paterson, No. 03-CV-3209, 2010 U.S.Dist. LEXIS 17949, at *22 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 1,
2010) (DAI HI).
6. See generally Arc of Wash. State, Inc. v. Braddock, 427 F.3d 615 (9th Cir. 2005); Fisher v. Okla.
Health Care Auth., 335 F.3d 1175 (10th Cir. 2003); Ball v. Rodgers, No. CV 00-67-TUC-EHC, 2009
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 45331 (D. Ariz. Apr. 24, 2009); Brantley v. Maxwell-Jolly, No: C 09-3798 SBA, 2009
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 91454 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 10, 2009); Makin ex rel. Russell v. Hawaii, 114 F. Supp. 2d
1017 (D. Haw. 1999); Masterman v. Goodno, Civ. No. 03-2939 (JRT/FLN), 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 354
(D. Minn. Jan. 8, 2004); Crabtree v. Goetz, No. 3:08-0939, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 103097, at *64
(M.D. Tenn. Dec. 18, 2008).
7. Kerrigan v. Phil. Bd. of Elections, Civ. No. 07-687, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 62263 (E.D. Pa.
Aug. 14,2008).
8. Iwata v. Intel Corp., 349 F. Supp. 2d 135 (D. Mass. 2004).
9. Lincoln CERCPAC v. Health & Hosps. Corp., 147 F.3d 165 (2d Cir. 1998); Brantley v.
Maxwell-Jolly, No: C 09-3798 SBA, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19154 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 10, 2009); V.L. v.
Wagner, No. C 09-04668 CW, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 99107 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 23, 2009); Crimmins v.
Fergus Falls Reg'l Treatment Ctr., Civ. File No. 02-3668 (PAM/RLE), 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1748 (D.
Minn. Jan. 17, 2003).
10. Doe v. Sylvester, No. CIV. A. 99-891, 2001 WL 1064810 (D. Del. Sept. 11, 2001).
11. Hahn v. Linn County, Iowa, 191 F. Supp. 2d 1051 (N.D. Iowa 2002).
12. Omega Healthcare Investors, Inc. v. Res-Care, Inc., 475 F.3d 853 (7th Cir. 2007).
13. See Schwartz v. Jefferson County, No. 2004CV000091 (Jefferson County Ci. Ct. Feb. 24,
2004).
14. See Tyler v. Smith, 472 F. Supp. 2d 818 (M.D. La. 2006) (upholding exemption of sheltered
workshops from unemployment compensation against ADA challenge); see also Okla. Goodwill Indus.,
[Vol. 26:3
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BEYOND RESIDENTIAL SEGREGATION
Yet sheltered workshops, also sometimes called "center-based
work" or "facility-based work," are also segregated work
environments often operated in conjunction with segregated facilities
or day habilitation programs. They often pay sub-minimum wages
and have been criticized for more than twenty years by courts,
developmental disability professionals, and scholars as isolating and
congregate dead-ends which rarely, if ever, result in meaningful
transition into actual mainstream employment. 15 Sometimes sheltered
workshops give their employees make-work, such as folding and
unfolding newspapers. When employees of sheltered workshops
attempted to unionize forty years ago, the NLRB found that it did not
even have jurisdiction since sheltered workshops' "essential purpose
is to provide therapeutic assistance rather than employment."
1 6
Inc. v. State ex rel Okla. Employment Sec. Comm'n, 219 P.3d 540 (Okla. 2009) (upholding exemption
from unemployment taxes of sheltered workshop employees, regardless of where they work).
15. See Jacobus tenBroek, The Character and Function of Sheltered Workshops, BLIND AMERICAN,
May 1962, available at http://www.blind.net/g3800001.htm; ZANA MARIE LUTFIYYA, PAT ROGAN &
BONNIE SHOULTZ, CTR. ON HUMAN POL'Y, SUPPORTED EMPLOYMENT: A CONCEPTUAL OVERVIEW
(1988), http://thechp.syr.edu/workovw.htm (citing critiques of sheltered workshops as early as 1976);
see also Opportunities for Too Few? Oversight of Federal Employment Programs for Persons with
Disabilities: Hearing Before S. Comm. on Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions, 109th Cong. 3
(2005) [hereinafter HELP Hearing], NAT'L COUNCIL ON DISABILITY (FORMERLY NAT'L COUNCIL ON
THE HANDICAPPED), TOWARDS INDEPENDENCE (1986) (criticizing sheltered workshops as non-
competitive and non-integrated work); James H. Omvig, More Progress in the Javits-Wagner-O'Day
Program: Establishing Best Practices for a Quality Work Environment, BRAILLE MONITOR, June 2009,
available at http://www.nib.org/documents/pressroon/2009/Braille MonitorArticle.doc (explaining that
the President's Committee for Purchase from People Who Are Blind or Severely Disabled adopted in
2009 the statement that all AbilityOne [JWOD program] workers should have "opportunities to do the
work of their choice with appropriate supports and/or workplace flexibilities, alongside nondisabled
employees... [and] ongoing training opportunities that make employment with other community based
businesses possible .... ).
16. Sheltered Workshops of San Diego, Inc., 126 N.L.R.B. 961 (1960). Later, the NLRB began
taking a more nuanced approach, looking to whether sheltered workshop employees were in fact in a
"typically industrial" rather than "primarily rehabilitative" setting. See Goodwill Indus. of S. Cal., 231
N.L.R.B. 536 (1977). In order to determine whether the setting was typically industrial, the Board
looked to four factors: long term employment at the sheltered workshop (since that would detract from
its alleged rehabilitative purpose), whether employees were disciplined in the same way as non-disabled
employees, whether they had to comply with productivity standards, and whether the counseling they
received was "limited." Id. at 536-37. Since 1977, the inquiry has been primarily fact-based, with both
the NLRB and appellate courts finding some sheltered workshops to be "primarily rehabilitative" while
others are "typical industrial settings." See, e.g., Davis Mem'l Goodwill Indus., Inc. v. N.L.R.B., 108
F.3d 406 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (reversing NLRB order to bargain with employees); Ark. Lighthouse for the
Blind v. N.L.R.B., 851 F.2d 180 (8th Cit. 1988); N.L.R.B. v. Lighthouse for Blind of Houston, 696 F.2d
399 (5th Cir. 1983) (enforcing NLRB's order to recognize and bargain with union); Brevard
20101
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Unlike clients of therapeutic programs, however, sheltered workshop
employees are laid off when there is no work, but cannot collect
unemployment benefits because states are permitted by federal law to
exempt sheltered workshop employees from unemployment
benefits. 17
Professionals in the field of developmental disabilities generally
favor the model of supported employment,' 8  which provides
individualized supports for disabled persons to join the regular
workforce working at actual jobs and receiving competitive wages.
This model has been shown to successfully integrate persons with
disabilities into mainstream employment. 19 Supported employment
programs provide coaching or other supports as necessary; these
supports are often phased out over time. At least one state, Vermont,
has prohibited the use of state funds for sheltered workshops, but they
continue to be utilized across the country.
20
The Americans with Disabilities Act does not prohibit segregated
services that operate to the benefit of people with disabilities and are
genuinely chosen and preferred by people with disabilities. The
legislative history of the ADA explicitly provides that sheltered
workshops are not automatically prohibited or foreclosed by the
enactment of the ADA. However, the ADA, its regulations and the
Department of Justice's guidance to those regulations make equally
clear that all people with disabilities must be given a choice of the
Achievement Ctr., Inc., 342 N.L.R.B. 982 (2004) (finding sheltered workshop "primarily
rehabilitative"); Cincinnati Ass'n for the Blind v. N.L.R.B., 672 F.2d 567 (6th Cir. 1982).
17. Tyler v. Smith, 472 F. Supp. 2d 818 (M.D. La. 2006).
18. Supported employment began in the late 1970s. See Joe Marrone & Martine Gold, Supported
Employment for People with Mental Illness: Myths and Facts, J. REHABILITATION, Oct.-Dec. 1994, at
38, available at 1994 WLNR 4950590. The term "supported employment" was coined by Madeleine
Will in 1984. Letter from Paul Wehman, Director, Vir. Commonwealth U. Rehabilitation Research &
Training Center (Jan. 21, 2010) (on file with author). Supported employment is an evidence-based
practice. See Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration,
http://www.mentalhealth.samhsa.gov/cmhs/CommunitySupport/toolkits/employment (last visited Feb.
19, 2010).
19. William C. Torrey, Robin E. Clark, Deborah R. Becker, Philip F. Wyzik & Robert E. Drake,
Switching from Rehabilitative Day Treatment to Supported Employment, in 4 CONTINUUM,
DEVELOPMENTS IN AMBULATORY HEALTH CARE 27 (L.L. Kennedy ed., 1997).
20. Jennifer Sullivan Sulewski, Working Together to Convert to the Last Sheltered Workshop in
Vermont to Individualized Supports, INST. FOR COMMUNITY INCLUSION,
http://www.communityinclusion.org/articl.php?article-id=201 (last visited Feb. 19, 2010).
[Vol. 26:3
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BEYOND RESIDENTIAL SEGREGATION
most integrated service appropriate to their needs and an opportunity
to reject segregated services ostensibly provided for their benefit. 21
This article examines the applicability of Title II of the ADA to
public entities that fund segregated employment and vocational
services to clients with cognitive and developmental disabilities.
Research for several decades amply reflects that supported
employment is appropriate for, and desired by, far more clients than
actually receive these services. In fact, the continued existence of
segregated sheltered workshops results primarily from a federal and
state statutory framework that continues to create incentives for
segregated day services, the preferences of parents and of some
agency staff, and (in some cases) the substantial profits that
workshops bring to the agencies that run them rather than the
preferences of, or benefits to, clients with disabilities or any evidence
that sheltered workshops represent a successful model to transition
people with disabilities into employment.
22
The article further argues that the Supreme Court's decision in
Olmstead v. L.C. and subsequent case law, including the recent case
of Disability Advocates, Inc. v. Paterson,23 amply support the
proposition that the ADA prohibits unjustified isolation of people
with disabilities in segregated sheltered workshops when those
people would prefer to work in the community with the aid of
supported employment services and the states currently fund
programs that would enable them to work in the community.
Sheltered workshops are outmoded vestiges of a historical
perspective that people with disabilities could not be employed in the
21. 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(d)(1991).
22. Although most sheltered workshops are run by non-profit agencies, some directors and executive
staff of those agencies receive six figure salaries. In addition, research has shown that in order to
continue to bring in contracts, sheltered workshops often keep their more skilled labor in order to fulfill
contracts, rather than make sustained efforts to find competitive and higher paid employment for those
individuals. See HELP Hearing, supra note 15, at 3, 10; see also Marvin Rosen, Albert Bussone, Peter
Dakunchak & John Cramp, Jr., Sheltered Employment and the Second Generation Workshop, J.
REHABILITATION, Jan.-Mar. 1993, at 30, available at 1993 WLNR 4771987.
23. See Disability Advocates, Inc. v. Paterson (DAI 1), 598 F. Supp. 2d 289 (E.D.N.Y. 2009);
Disability Advocates, Inc. v. Paterson (DAJ I), 653 F. Supp. 2d 184 (E.D.N.Y. 2009); Disability
Advocates Inc v. Paterson, No. 03-CV-3209, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17949, at *22 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 1,
2010) (DAI III).
20101
HeinOnline -- 26 Ga. St. U. L. Rev. 879 2009-2010
)  I  I  879 
i t    
 ser ices ostensibly provided for their benefit.21 
  
 t  
l  
  t  
i t    
  f 
 il   
    
 ,    
f,  l  
   
 ,     
   l  
it  isa ilities into employment.22 
'  
 c. t    
ility .  terson,23  
ti   
   
 
 t  
  
   
   
.  .l )(1991). 
. lt  t lt r  r s r  r   - r fit i ,  ir t rs  ti  
   i  i  i  i  l i . I  iti ,    t t i  r r t  
   
  t    t  
.  ring,    
  ., lt  eration . 
I I I , , le   
.  i ilit  t , I . . t r  ( I I),  . .   ( . . . . ); 
it  , .  l I),   . . . .   
t  t. . I, 
   
5
Stefan: Beyond Residential Segregation:  The Application of Olmstead to S
Published by Reading Room, 2010
GEORGIA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
regular workforce and needed to be "sheltered" in segregated
settings. In the last few years, federal agencies that allocate the
billions of federal dollars that support sheltered workshops have
started to transform the system into one that is more integrated and
pays closer to the minimum wage. These changes are, however, being
achieved slowly and incrementally. They do not undermine the
fundamental fact that segregated sheltered work settings are
maintained, not for the benefit of people with disabilities, but because
they are part of a long-existing and well-funded system of
congregating and segregating people with disabilities. As recent
investigations have revealed, some sheltered workshops are also cash
cows for a number of very large and profitable industries.
Supported employment, which integrates people with disabilities
into actual employment in the community, with accompanying
wages, self-esteem, and the opportunity to spend time with non-
disabled people, has been funded by states for years and has shown
itself successful in serving precisely the same kinds of people who
are currently stagnating in sheltered workshops. Advocates should
apply the prohibitions of Title II of the ADA 24 to force states
providing vocational assistance to people with disabilities to convert
entirely to integrated supported employment.
I. THE INTEGRATION MANDATE AND OLMSTEAD V. L. C.
A. The Integration Mandate
When Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act25 was passed in 1973,
it contained a single line prohibiting discrimination on the basis of
handicap in programs receiving federal funding.26 Because programs
receiving federal funds were funded by different agencies across the
Executive Branch from the Department of Transportation to the
Department of Housing and Urban Development, 27 each federal
24. 42 U.S.C. § 12131 (2006).
25. 45 C.F.R. § 84 (2009).
26. Rehabilitation Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-112, § 504, 87 Stat. 355, 394.
27. See 28 C.F.R. § 35.190 (1991) (describing agencies charged with enforcing the regulations).
|Vol. 26:3
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agency had to develop its own regulations to implement Section 504
in the particular programs it funded.28
While each agency would have regulations specific to the focus of
the agency, it was obvious that many definitions and other aspects of
the regulations would be identical across the agencies. Therefore, a
"lead agency" was designated to issue so-called "coordination
regulations" which applied to all agencies and which had special
authority.2 9 The then Department of Health, Education and Welfare
(HEW) was designated the "lead agency" but failed to develop any
coordination regulations. 30 After significant pressure, including a
federal lawsuit31 and disability activists taking over the San Francisco
office of the HEW and picketing the home of Secretary Califano,
32
HEW reluctantly issued regulations implementing Section 504 of the
Rehabilitation Act of 1973.33
One of these "coordination" regulations, which applied across the
board to all recipients of federal funds regardless of their program,
was the forerunner of the regulation that came to be known as the
integration mandate. 34 In its definition of "discrimination" in the
coordination regulations, the Department of Health and Human
Services (HHS) defined discrimination as a failure to provide equally
effective aids, benefits and services to handicapped individuals as
nonhandicapped person.35 The regulation added:
28. All agencies have to develop their own 504 regulations. See id. for a description of agencies
charged with enforcing the regulations.
29. Id.
30. Exec. Order No. 12,250, 45 Fed. Reg. 72,995 (Nov. 2, 1980). See also Helen L. v. Didario, 46
F.3d 325, 330 (3d Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 813 (1995).
31. Cherry v. Matthews, 419 F. Supp. 922, 923 (D.C. 1976).
32. For accounts of the history behind the battle to obtain regulations for Section 504, see RICHARD
SCOTCH, FROM GOODWILL TO CIVIL RIGHTS: TRANSFORMING FEDERAL DISABILITY POLICY (1984)
111-16; JOSEPH SHAPIRO, No PITY: PEOPLE WITH DISABILITIES FORGING A NEW CIVIL RIGHTS
MOVEMENT 65,66 (1994).
33. These regulations are entitled "Nondiscrimination on Basis of Handicap in Programs or
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For purposes of this part, aids, benefits, and services, to be
equally effective, are not required to produce the identical result
or level of achievement for handicapped and nonhandicapped
persons, but must afford handicapped persons equal opportunity
to obtain the same result, to gain the same benefit, or to reach the
same level of achievement, in the most integrated setting
appropriate to the person's needs.36
Later, the "lead agency" function for Rehabilitation Act anti-
discrimination regulations was shifted to the Department of Justice,
which in turn wrote regulations applicable to all agencies. 37 It defined
discrimination to include the failure to provide services in the most
integrated setting appropriate to the individual's needs.
38
After the Americans with Disabilities Act was passed, the
Department of Justice was charged with writing regulations to
elaborate the prohibition on discrimination contained in Title II of the
ADA,39 which was almost as spare as the language of Section 504 of
the Rehabilitation Act. When the Department of Justice wrote the
regulations for Title II, it included a regulation that came to be known
as the integration mandate. In addition, its Interpretive Guidance to
the Title II regulations added a definition of an integrated setting for
the first time.41 An integrated setting was defined as "a setting that
enables disabled individuals to interact with non-disabled persons to
the fullest extent possible.
'A2
Although usually only 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(d) is referenced as the
integration mandate, the DOJ Interpretive Guidance underscores that
the regulation ensuring that people with disabilities are provided with
a choice to refuse any segregated setting offered as an
"accommodation" to their disabilities constitutes an integral part of
the integration mandate:
36. 45 C.F.R. § 84.4(b)(2) (2005).
37. See SHAPIRO, supra note 32, at 129-30.
38. 28 C.F.R. § 41.51(d) (1981).
39. 28 C.F.R. § 35.130 (1991).
40. Id. § 35.130(d).
41. Id. pt. 35, app. A.
42. Id.
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Paragraphs (d) and (e), previously referred to in the discussion of
Paragraph (b)(1)(iv) [the provision that permits public entities to
offer separate services] provide that the public entity must
administer services, programs, and activities in the most
integrated setting appropriate to the needs of qualified
individuals with disabilities, i.e. in a setting that enables
individuals with disabilities to interact with nondisabled persons
to the fullest extent possible, and that persons with disabilities
must be provided with the option of declining to accept a
particular accommodation. 43
Thus, the right to enjoy services in the most integrated setting
appropriate to the individual's disabilities is accompanied by a
parallel right to refuse separate or segregated services offered
ostensibly to benefit or accommodate the individual's disability.
B. The Homeward Bound Case and Integration in Vocational
Services
The first case to recognize that unnecessary discrimination
constituted segregation was decided several years before the passage
of the Americans with Disabilities Act.4  Homeward Bound v.
Hissom Memorial Center is an unjustly neglected case, years ahead
of its time in its understanding of the true components of community
integration,45  including supported employment in community
settings. The court in Homeward Bound created principles and
remedies that remain as alive and true today as they were over twenty
years ago. Homeward Bound was brought on behalf of individuals
with developmental disabilities institutionalized at the Hissom
Memorial Center in Oklahoma, and sought to provide those
individuals and their families with the services they needed to live in
43. ADA Title II Interpretive Guidance, id § 35.130(d) and (e).
44. Homeward Bound v. Hissom Mem'l Ctr., No. 85-C-437-E, 1987 WL 27104 (N.D. Okla. July 24,
1987).
45. 1 have discussed elsewhere the understanding of the importance of family integration in the
Homeward Bound decision. See Susan Stefan, Accommodating Families: Using the Americans with
Disabilities Act to Keep Families Together, 2 ST. LOUIS U. J. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 135 (2008).
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the community.46 Among those services were employment services.
More than twenty years ago, the judge wrote:
The Court is cognizant of the radical change which the
perception of employment capabilities of persons with severe
disabilities has undergone in the past several years. Whereas
sheltered workshops and work activity centers were previously
considered the only possible place in which to employ people
with disabling conditions, now many professionals consider
these places the last resort when every other employment option
has failed. The Court is similarly cognizant of the 1986
Amendment to the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (Public Law 99-
506) which creates a new formula grant to assist states in
developing supported employment options for persons who are
unable to function independently in employment without on-
going support services for the duration of their employment.
Such change in the perception of employment possibilities and
the corresponding federal legislation afford Hissom class
members substantial opportunities for meaningful employment in
an integrated work setting.
The Court directs that all Hissom class members are to receive
prevocational and vocational services commensurate with his/her
need. This will necessitate that the State accelerate and perhaps
redirect its efforts to create employment options for persons with
severe disabilities. The State will have to overcome resistance to
employment of such persons based on the conventional
arguments that limitations in physical and mental fitness lessen
their ability to produce on the job and that employers prefer able-
bodied workers, even if disadvantaged, to workers with
disabilities. The State will have to engage business in a
partnership to create a variety of supported and transitional job
options for all Oklahoma citizens with severe disabilities who
wish to work. In doing so, the Court directs the State to use the
Medicaid waiver budget applicable to the Hissom class to assure
46. Homeward Bound, 1987 WL 27104, at *1-6.
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that each member receives the kind and amount of prevocational
and vocational services which the IDT assessment deems
appropriate.47
In addition, as part of the objectives and remedies of the case, the
court ordered the development of supported and transitional
employment options:
5. Sheltered workshops and work activity centers are to be
encouraged and assisted to develop supported and transitional
employment options for Hissom class members, with the
assistance of the State.
6. The State Vocational Rehabilitation Agency is to be engaged
in the development of supported and transitional employment
options for Hissom class members in recognition of its
responsibilities for doing so pursuant to the 1986 Amendment to
the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (P.L. 99-506).48
In 1987, the Homeward Bound court recognized the importance of
an array of employment options for people with severe cognitive
disabilities directing that
Concentration on development of a single kind of employment
option for Hissom class members should be avoided in favor of
attempts to create the full array of options-job coaches for
competitive employment, shared jobs in the transitional
employment program (TEP), the specialized training program
(STP), mobile work crews, sheltered enclaves in industry, etc.
49
But supported employment was clearly the wave of the future
anticipated by the Homeward Bound court:
47. Id. at *38.
48. Id. at *39.
49. Id. at *40.
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9. High priority should be directed toward development of a
partnership with the business community to educate and obtain
the assistance of not only the leadership but also rank and file
workers in creating integrated employment options for persons
with severe disabilities, including Hissom class members.50
The Homeward Bound court was correct in forecasting that
supported employment would gain a share of state-funded vocational
service dollars, as well as increasing support in the professional
community. Supported employment would be awarded the status of
an evidence-based practice 51 and would be the sole form of
vocational service funded by at least one state, Vermont.52 But
sheltered workshops have stubbornly hung on, largely because they
are hugely underwritten by federal dollars and a federal system that
structurally subsidizes segregation, even as it rhetorically supports
integration and provides limited funding to integrated programs.
Essentially, this is similar to the current federal system that supports
institutionalization in nursing homes and congregate facilities, even
as it rhetorically supports community integration and funds
community-based "waivers." 53 The difference is that the structure of
residential institutionalization began to be challenged in the courts in
1995,54 and those challenges have accelerated to the present, while
50. Id
51. See AGENCY FOR HEALTHCARE QUALITY & RESEARCH, THE SCHIZOPHRENIA PATIENT
OUTCOMES RESEARCH TEAM (PORT) TREATMENT RECOMMENDATIONS (1998),
http://www.ahrq.gov/clinic/schzrec.htm (recommendation 28 providing range of vocational services that
should be included).
52. See Sulewski, supra note 20.
53. See, e.g., Daniel McCarthy, Daniel Thompson & Susan Olson, Planning a Statewide Project to
Convert Day Treatment to Supported Employment, 22 PSYCHIATRIC REHABILITATION J. 30, 31 (1998)
("Medicaid reimbursement has perpetuated the use of day program treatment centers, and split financing
of vocational rehabilitation and mental health resources has made it difficult to integrate vocational and
clinical services."); David Mank, The Underachievement of Supported Employment: A Call for
Reinvestment, 5 J. DISABILITY POL'Y STUD. 1, 17 (1994) (stating that if federal and state governments
were serious about supported employment, they would "cease to offer segregated options for any person
entering the system"); Andrew Batavia, A Right to Personal Assistance Services: "Most Integrated
Setting Appropriate " Requirements and the Independent Living Model of Long Term Care, 27 AM. J.L.
& MED. 23-24 (2001); K.C. Lakin, R. Prouty & K. Coucouvanis, Twenty Year Retrospective on
Proposals to Eliminate 'Institutional Bias' in Medicaid for Persons with ID/DD, 44 MENTAL
RETARDATION 450-54 (2006).
54. Helen L. v. Didario, 46 F.3d 325 (3d Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 813 (1995).
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the segregated employment and other day habilitation systems have
not been the subject of any systemic court challenge to date.
C. The Olmstead Decision
1. The Facts in Olmstead
Lois Curtis and Elaine Wilson were women with co-occurring
mental retardation and psychiatric disabilities who were
institutionalized in Georgia Regional Hospital in Atlanta for years
after their treatment professionals believed they would benefit from
placement in the community. 55 Georgia officials argued that there
were no available community placements for either woman.
56
Georgia had applied for and received permission to use Medicaid
money to pay for up to 2,109 community placements, but had only
developed 700 such placements, failing to utilize all the funds
available to it.57  According to the Georgia state defendants, no
appropriate placements existed for either woman in community
settings. At one point, the hospital tried to discharge Elaine Wilson to
a homeless shelter, but her advocates went immediately to court, and
the proposed discharge was rescinded.
58
2. The Procedural History
In the district court, Judge Shoob initially granted summary
judgment for the plaintiffs in this case, finding that unnecessary
institutionalization constituted discrimination per se, which could not
be justified by lack of funding because the cost of providing the two
women services in the community was negligible compared to the
budget of the state agency.
59
55. Olmstead v. L.C., 527 U.S. 581, 593 (1999).
56. Id. at 598.
57. Id. at 601.
58. Id. at 593.
59. L.C. v. Olmstead, No. 1:95-cv-1210-MHS, 1997 WL 148674, at *3 (N.D. Ga. Mar. 26, 1997)
("[U]nder the ADA, unnecessary institutional segregation of the disabled constitutes discrimination per
se, which cannot be justified by a lack of funding."). I entirely agree with Judge Shoob's holding, since
the legislative history makes clear that Congress intended that claims of unnecessary segregation under
Title II should not be analyzed as "reasonable accommodation" claims. See SUSAN STEFAN, UNEQUAL
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This decision was appealed to the Eleventh Circuit, which affirmed
in part.60 However, the Eleventh Circuit held that the judge erred in
comparing the cost of serving the two women in the community with
the state's entire mental health budget; rather, the appropriate test
was whether the State could prove "that requiring it to expend
additional funds to provide LC and EW with integrated services
would be so unreasonable given the demands of the State mental
health budget that it would fundamentally alter the service the State
provides.' '61 However, the Eleventh Circuit panel warned that such a
defense would succeed "only in the most limited of circumstances." 62
Because the district court had rejected a cost-based defense entirely,
the Eleventh Circuit remanded.63
Under ordinary circumstances, the district court would have
reconsidered its decision, subject to appeal to the Eleventh Circuit
and then to the Supreme Court. However, twenty-two states and the
territory of Guam asked the Supreme Court to grant certiorari, and
the Court acceded "in view of the importance of the question
presented to the states and affected individuals." 64 The Supreme
Court granted certiorari, and on June 22, 1999, it issued its decision.
During this time, Judge Shoob reconsidered his decision and found
that the State of Georgia had not met the standard laid out by the
Eleventh Circuit.6
5
3. The Olmstead Holdings
Justice Ginsberg began the majority opinion with the clear
statement:
This case concerns the proper construction of the anti-
discrimination provision contained in the public services portion
RIGHTS: DISCRIMINATION AGAINST PEOPLE WITH MENTAL DISABILITIES AND THE AMERICANS WITH
DISABILITIES AcT 118 (Bruce D. Sales et al. eds., 2001).
60. L.C. v. Olmstead, 138 F.3d 893, 895 (11 th Cir. 1998).
61. Id. at 905.
62. Id. at 902.
63. Id. at 905.
64. Olmstead v. L.C., 527 U.S. 581, 596 n.8 (1999).
65. Id. at 596 n.7.
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(Title I) of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA).
Specifically, we confront the question whether the proscription
of discrimination may require placement of persons with mental
disabilities in community settings rather than in institutions. The
answer, we hold, is a qualified yes.66
The majority held that plaintiffs with disabilities were entitled to
placement in community settings when 1) the State's treatment
professionals determined that such placement was appropriate; 2) the
transfer was not opposed by the individual; and 3) the placement
could be reasonably accommodated, taking into account the resources
available to the State and the needs of others with mental
disabilities.67
The majority went into some detail to explain why unnecessary
segregation constituted discrimination under the ADA and its
regulations. 68 It explored the damage that unjustified isolation caused
both to the people so isolated and to the society that would continue
to misunderstand and stigmatize them. Interestingly, Justice Ginsberg
began with the greater social harm caused by unnecessary
segregation: it "perpetuates unwarranted assumptions that persons so
isolated are incapable or unworthy of participating in community
,69life." Justice Ginsberg followed this observation with citations from
prior Supreme Court cases on racial and gender discrimination,
underscoring the underlying similarity of race, sex, and disability
discrimination.
Second, unjustified isolation harms those subjected to it by
depriving them of opportunities for "every day life activities" that the
66. Id. at 587 (internal citations omitted).
67. Id. at 607.
68. Id. at 589-92. Perhaps ominously, the Court noted initially that "[w]e recite these regulations
with the caveat that we do not determine their validity . . . .We do not understand petitioners to
challenge the regulatory formulations themselves as outside the congressional authorization." Id. at 592.
However, courts from pre-Olmstead days to the present have held that the integration regulation has the
force of law. See, e.g., Helen L. v. Didario, 46 F.3d 325, 332 (3d Cir. 1995); Disability Advocates, Inc.
v. Paterson (DAI ), 598 F. Supp. 2d 289, 313 (E.D.N.Y. 2009); Brantley v. Maxwell-Jolly, No: C 09-
3798 SBA, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 91454, at *37 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 10, 2009); Crabtree v. Goetz, No.
3:08-0939, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 103097, at *64 (M.D. Tenn. Dec. 18, 2008).
69. Olmstead v. L.C., 527 U.S. 581, 600 (1999).
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rest of us take for granted, including "family relations, social
contacts, work options, economic independence, educational
advancement, and cultural enrichment."7 °
Finally, the court noted that people with mental disabilities were
forced, as people without disabilities were not, to relinquish
participation in community life, which they could have enjoyed with
reasonable accommodations, in order to receive the medical services
that they needed.7'
The reasoning set out by the Court did not limit the concept of
segregation by disability to institutional settings. Rather, "unjustified
isolation, we hold, is properly regarded as discrimination based on
disability., 72 Justice Ginsberg emphasized, over a dissent by Justice
Thomas, that no comparison class was needed to make out a claim
for discrimination under the ADA 73 and that
under Title II of the ADA, States are required to provide
community-based treatment for persons with mental disabilities
when the State's treatment professionals determine that such
placement is appropriate, the persons do not oppose such
treatment, and the placement can be reasonably accommodated,
taking into account the resources available to the State and the
needs of others with mental disabilities.
74
4. The Olmstead Defenses
The Court did permit states to assert a defense when a claim for
community integration would fundamentally alter the state's services
and programs.75 As an example of a potentially successful defense,
the Court noted that where a state could show that it had "a
comprehensive, effectively working plan for placing qualified
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 593.
73. Id. at 598.
74. Id. at 587.
75. Olmstead, 527 U.S. at 605. Although only four justices concurred in this portion of the opinion,
lower courts have consistently read it as a holding of Olmstead. See, e.g., Arc of Wash. State, Inc. v.
Braddock, 427 F.3d 615, 619 n.3 (9th Cir. 2005).
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individuals with disabilities in less restrictive settings, and a waiting
list that moved at a reasonable pace not controlled by the State's
endeavors to keep its institutions fully populated, the reasonable
modifications standard would be met.",76 For ten years after
Olmstead, litigation centered on the scope and meaning of the
defense to community integration created by the Supreme Court.
D. Court Decisions Regarding the Integration Mandate After
Olmstead
1. The First Decade of Court Decisions: The Meaning of
"Fundamental Alteration "
As noted in the introductory section to this article, virtually all of
the cases after Olmstead involved attempts to place people from
individual institutions into the community. The major legal
controversies raised by these cases involved interpretation of the
fundamental alteration defense. Could a claim for integrated services
be defeated simply by the assertion that it might involve the
expenditure of additional state funds? 77 Was the existence of a so-
called Olmstead plan an absolute defense? 78  What were the
components of an Olmstead plan? 79 Did the absence of an Olmstead
plan defeat a fundamental alteration defense? At what pace, over
what period of time, encompassing what populations, did the State
have to move in order to fulfill its responsibilities under the ADA to
its disabled citizens? 80 How were the complex financial components
involved in a fundamental alteration defense to be analyzed?
76. Olmstead, 527 U.S. at 605-06.
77. The answer to that question is no. See Frederick L. v. Dep't of Pub. Welfare, 422 F.3d 151 (3d
Cir. 2005); L.C. v. Olmstead, 138 F.3d 893, 902 (11 th Cir. 1998); Messier v. Southbury Training Sch.,
562 F. Supp. 2d 294 (D. Conn. 2008). In fact, Congress itself had anticipated this defense, and noted that
"[t]he fact that it is more convenient, either administratively or fiscally, to provide services in a
segregated manner, does not constitute a valid justification for separate or different services .... " H.R.
REP. No. 101-485(III), at 50 (1990), as reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 445, 473.
78. See infra notes 288, 289.
79. Id.
80. Williams v. Wasserman, 164 F. Supp. 2d 591 (D. Md. 2001).
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In some cases, questions were raised as to whether the absence of a
recommendation by state professionals meant that individuals were
not "otherwise qualified" to move to the community. What did it
mean if the state professionals did not bother to recommend people
who were appropriate for community placement because they knew
no placements were available or because of pressure from family
members?
81
Because these cases were brought on behalf of people who were in
institutions, or at risk of being institutionalized, one issue that did not
receive much attention was the meaning of "segregation" and the
requirement that services be integrated. The general belief shared by
advocates was that requiring the State to discharge people from
institutions into the community would result in the creation of a more
integrated system.82 But in the decade following Olmstead, it became
increasingly clear that many state mental health and developmental
disability systems operated within a framework that offered
"community" services in a context of control and segregation, even
after discharge from formal institutional settings. People who lived in
what was euphemistically called "the community" still lived
regimented lives with other disabled people, had little control over
the most mundane decisions of their lives, and had little or no
interaction with non-disabled people. 83 Although truly integrated
residential and day services such as supported housing and supported
employment existed and had been funded by states for years, the
demand for these services far outpaced the funding they received.
84
81. See Charles Q. v. Houstoun, No. 1:CV-95-280, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21671 and 21681 (M.D.
Pa. Apr. 22, 1996); Messier v. Southbury Training Sch., 562 F. Supp.2d 294 (D. Conn. 2008).
82. See, e.g., Samuel R. Bagenstos, Justice Ginsberg and the Judicial Role in Expanding "We the
People, ": The Disability Rights Cases, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 49, 54-58 (2004); Neil S. Butler, In the
Most Appropriate Setting: The Rights of Mentally Disabled Indviduals Under the Americans with
Disabilities Act in the Wake of Olmstead v. L.C., 49 CATH. U. L. REV. 1021 (2000); Joanne Karger,
Don't Tread on the ADA: Olmstead v. L.C. ex rel. Zimring and the Future of Community Integration for
People with Mental Disabilities, 40 B.C. L. REV. 1221 (1999); Jennifer Mathis, Community Integration
of Individuals with Disabilities: An Update on Olmstead Implementation, 35 CLEARINGHOUSE REV.
395 (2001).
83. See, e.g., Disability Advocates, Inc. v. Paterson (DAI 1), 598 F. Supp. 2d 289 (E.D.N.Y. 2009).
84. Mank, supra note 53, at 9.
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2. DAI v. Paterson: The Meaning of Segregation
Thus in many cases, so-called community services were merely
replications of institutional life. In New York, many people who had
been discharged from state institutions were funneled into large
congregate facilities known as adult homes.85 Ironically, these adult
homes were sometimes actually larger and more regimented than the
institutions from which people had been discharged.86 The New York
Times ran a prize-winning expose of the squalid conditions in which
people lived, the profits made by operators of the homes, and the
cozy arrangements between the operators of the adult homes and
Medicaid providers who billed for services to the residents-services
that the residents may not have wanted or needed.87 In 2001, a
successful lawsuit was brought on behalf of adult home residents who
had been subjected to unnecessary prostate cancer surgery in order to
enrich adult home operators.
88
In 2003, a group of advocates challenged adult homes as violating
the integration mandate of the Americans with Disabilities Act.
89
This case, brought by the Bazelon Center for Mental Health Law,
Disability Advocates Inc., the private law firm of Paul Weiss Rifkin,
the Urban Justice Center, New York Lawyers for the Public Interest,
and MFY Legal Services, challenged the largest of the so-called
"impacted" adult homes in New York City, for-profit residences with
more than 120 residents, of whom at least 25% or 25, whichever was
fewer, received mental health services. 9° Plaintiffs claimed that
virtually no one with a psychiatric disability was appropriately
housed in the "impacted adult homes" targeted by the litigation,91 but
85. DAI1, 598 F. Supp. 2d 289.
86. Id.
87. See the Broken Homes series by Clifford J. Levy: Clifford J. Levy, For Mentally Il, Death and
Misery, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 28, 2002, at Al; Clifford J. Levy, Here, Life Is Squalor and Chaos, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 29, 2002, at Al; and Clifford J. Levy, Voiceless, Defenseless, and a Source of Cash, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 30, 2002, at Al.
88. Bowen v. Rubin, 01-CV-0070, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25283 (E.D.N.Y. May 17,2002).
89. Disability Advocates, Inc. v. Paterson (DAII1), 653 F. Supp. 2d 184 (E.D.N.Y. 2009).
90. Id. at 187.
91. Id. at 197.
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rather that all or virtually all persons currently housed in adult homes
could be served in supported housing.
92
On Feb. 19, 2009, Judge Garaufis issued a 112 page opinion
denying defendant's motion for summary judgment, holding that the
integration mandate required providing services that offered not
simply an opportunity to interact with people without disabilities, but
the maximum opportunity to do so. 9 3 On September 8, 2009, after a
five week bench trial, the judge agreed that defendants discriminated
against the residents of the largest impacted adult homes in New
York City by failing to provide them with services in the most
integrated setting appropriate to their needs, and ordered defendants
to come up with a remedial plan. 94 The judge found that these
allegedly "community" residences were actually institutions, but also
held that plaintiffs did not have to show that their services were
provided in institutions to prevail under an integration mandate
claim. 95 Rather, all they had to show was that they were not receiving
services in the most integrated setting, that is, the setting that
maximized their ability to interact with non-disabled people.
96
In finding that adult homes were institutions, the judge looked to
their large size, the control they exercised over every aspect of
residents' lives, their isolation from non-disabled people, and their
lack of individualization and individualized services. 97 These are also
all characteristics of sheltered workshops. The judge rejected
defendant's arguments that adult homes did not violate the
integration mandate and that adult home residents were not
"otherwise qualified" to live in supported housing because of the
92. Id. at 219.
93. Id. at 184.
94. DA1 11, 653 F. Supp. 2d 184. The judge permitted defendant to offer its own remedial plan
initially, but on March 1, 2010, ruled that "instead of making a good faith proposal, defendants offered a
plan that scarcely began to address" the violations found by the court, and therefore the court adopted
much of the plaintiff's proposed remedial order. DAI v. Paterson, No. 03-CV-3209, 2010 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 17949, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 1, 2010).
95. Id. at 187.
96. Id.
97. Id at 290.
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severity of their disabilities and their failure to apply to live in
supported housing.
98
On March 1, 2010, the court issued an opinion rejecting the
defendants' proposed remedial plan and requiring them "to develop
at least 1500 supported housing units per year until there is sufficient
capacity for all plaintiffs constituents who desire such housing, and
no fewer than 4,500 units in total." 99 In his accompanying remedial
order 1°° the judge ordered that all adult home residents who desired
housing in supported housing be supplied with such housing within a
four year period' 0 1 and approved an "in-reach" educational effort to
assure that adult home residents were aware of the choices available
to them. 102
II. VOCATIONAL AND EMPLOYMENT SERVICES FOR PEOPLE WITH
DEVELOPMENTAL AND COGNITIVE DISABILITIES
A. Models of Employment Services for People with Disabilities
1. The Sheltered Workshop Model
The sheltered workshop model is characterized by repetitive
piecework, which has been subcontracted to the sheltered workshops
by companies that never interact with the disabled employees
performing the work. 103 Some sheltered workshops also create "make
work" for their clients when contracted work is not available, or have
them play games appropriate for children, such as alphabet bingo. 1
04
98. Id. at 257.
99. Disability Advocates Inc. v. Paterson, No. 03-CV-3209, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17949, at *22
(E.D.N.Y. Mar. 1, 2010) (DAI III).
100. Order, Disability Advocates Inc. v. Paterson, No. 03-CV-3209, available at
www.bazelon.org/incourt/docket/DAI/DAlOrderon remedy3-1-10.pdf.
101. The judge approved exceptions for three categories of residents: those with severe dementia,
high levels of nursing needs, or those who were likely to cause imminent danger to themselves or others.
Id. at 7-8.
102. Id.
103. LUTFIYYA, ROGAN & SHOULTZ, supra note 15.
104. SHAPIRO, supra note 32, at 249.
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Sheltered workshops are by definition "sheltered," i.e. segregated
from contact with the public.'0 5 They have generally involved less
than minimum wage work, and often lacked any of the legal
protections associated with traditional employment in the workforce,
such as unemployment compensation,'0 6 the ability to unionize, 10 7 or
worker's compensation. 108 Lacking the benefits of traditional
employment, they also lack the hallmarks of therapy or treatment: the
piecework is not individualized to the abilities, talents or preferences
of the consumer but is determined by the subcontracts negotiated by
the workshop, and there is little evidence or expectation of progress
from the segregated to integrated settings.
10 9
Almost all of these characteristics are the result of a complex
federal, state, and private funding and regulatory structure, including
105. Rosen et al., supra note 22 (exploring the meaning of "sheltered"); U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING
OFFICE, SPECIAL MINIMUM WAGE PROGRAM, CENTERS OFFER EMPLOYMENT AND SUPPORT SERVICES
TO WORKERS WITH DISABILITIES, BUT LABOR SHOULD IMPROVE OVERSIGHT 10 (2001), available at
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d01886.pdf [hereinafter GAO REPORT (2001)]; LUTFIYYA, ROGAN &
SHOULTZ, supra note 15.
106. For example, § 3309(b)(4) of the Federal Unemployment Tax Act, 28 U.S.C. § 3309 (2006),
permits states to exclude sheltered workshops from coverage under state unemployment compensation
programs (service performed in a facility for purpose of carrying out program of rehabilitation for
individuals whose earning capacity is impaired by age or physical or mental deficiency or injury, or
providing remunerative work for individuals who because of their impaired mental or physical capacity
cannot readily be absorbed into the competitive labor market). See Tyler v. Smith, 472 F. Supp. 2d 818,
825 (M.D. La. 2006) ("Likewise, this Court holds that the ADA and RA are not violated by FUTA's
characterizing, for purposes of section 3309(b)(4), that certain disabled persons are within the category
of individuals who receive services from entities which are covered by the exemption.").
107. Sheltered Workshops of San Diego, Inc., 126 N.L.R.B. 961 (1960). Since 1960, some sheltered
workshops have been required to permit unions and others have remained protected, based on an
individualized inquiry. See supra note 16.
108. Although each state has its own workers' compensation law, many states exempt employees of
sheltered workshops. See, e.g., N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 33.09(c) (McKinney 1989) (exempting
employees of sheltered workshops from workers compensation requirements but permitting an employer
to elect to cover them under workers' compensation); CAL. GOV'T CODE § 12926 (West 2005) (excludes
from definition of "employee" for purposes of discrimination law any individual employed in a sheltered
workshop). Some states, including those like Missouri that are increasing their support of sheltered
workshops, require sheltered workshops to maintain workers compensation insurance. See MO. CODE
REGS. ANN. tit. 5, § 70-770.010(2)(D) (1999).
109. Thomas Simmons & Robert Flexer, Business and Rehabilitation Factors in the Development of
Supported Employment Programs for Adults with Developmental Disabilities, J. REHABILITATION, Jan.-
Mar. 1992, at 35, available at 1992 WLNR 4695411; see also HELP Hearing, supra note 15; GAO
REPORT (2001), supra note 105, at 11; Peter Blanck, Helen A. Schartz & Kevin M. Schartz, Labor
Force Participation and Income of Individuals with Disabilities in Sheltered and Competitive
Employment: Cross-Sectional and Longitudinal Analyses of Seven States During the 1980s and 1990s,
44 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1029, 1041 (2003).
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the federal Departments of Education, Labor, and Health and Human
Services; state agencies for individuals with cognitive, developmental
and emotional disabilities; and a federal statute known as the Javits-
Wagner-O'Day-Act (JWOD).I10
The Javits-Wagner-O'Day Act was originally intended to fund
segregated work for blind people who could not get work in
mainstream employment, and after 1971111 funded work for people
with any disability sufficiently severe to preclude competitive
employment. In order to qualify for the benefits of the Javits-
Wagner-O'Day Act, 112 an employer must employ primarily (seventy-
five percent) workers with disabilities113 While technically, this does
not require an absolutely segregated environment, as a practical
matter, sheltered workshops do not involve interactions with people
without disabilities. Historically, segregating persons with disabilities
was considered a protective mechanism that allowed them to safely
experience the benefits of a work environment. 114 Today's sheltered
workshops reflect these origins, but have not evolved to fit in a
culture that has come to appreciate the ability and the legal right of
individuals with disabilities to work successfully in an integrated
environment, even if employers must make reasonable
accommodations to enable them to do so.
115
110. Javits-Wagner-O'Day Act, 41 U.S.C. §§ 46-48c (1993).
111. Only blind people received the benefit of this substantial federal program until 1971, when the
Javits-Wagner-O'Day Act was amended to include people with severe disabilities.
112. The Javits-Wagner-O'Day program has been known as "AbilityOne" since 2006. First passed in
1938 as the Wagner-O'Day Act to benefit blind people, the Act requires the federal government to set
aside some contracts for non-profits that employ people with disabilities. Those contracts include such
things as manufacturing uniforms, canteens, and chemical suits for the U.S. military, and janitorial
services at federal buildings. This has become a multi-billion dollar industry.
113. Javits-Wagner-O'Day Act, 41 U.S.C. § 48b(3)(C) (1976).
114. Rosen et al., supra note 22.
115. When it passed the Americans with Disabilities Act in 1990, Congress found that isolation and
segregation of people with disabilities was a national problem, which persisted in critical areas including
employment, and that the "nation's proper goals" for individuals with disabilities were "full
participation" "equality of opportunity" and "independent living." 42 U.S.C. § 12101(2), (3), (7) (2006).
The Americans with Disabilities Act requires employers to make "reasonable accommodations" in order
to integrate employees with disabilities into the workforce. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A) (2006). See also
Blanck, Schartz & Schartz, supra note 109, at 1033, 1039.
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2. History of Sheltered Workshops
Although sheltered workshops had existed in Europe for centuries,
the first American sheltered workshop was opened in 1838 by the
Perkins Institute for the Blind in Massachusetts. 1 6 Other institutes
and schools serving people who were blind soon followed the Perkins
model and built their own workshops."l 7 All of these workshops had
one goal: to provide occupational skills training that would allow
people who were blind to participate in mainstream workforce."
8
Nevertheless, despite training in manufacturing brooms, chair
bottoms and mattresses, graduates were not able to secure
employment. 119  The workshop graduates returned to the shops
seeking employment to support themselves, and the workshops
evolved from training centers to assist people who were blind into the
mainstream workforce into long-term segregated employment. 12
0
This was a role that the institutes and schools neither desired nor
could afford.121 Workshop doors at schools and institutions were
often closed within a few years of opening, although the Perkins
workshop lasted until 1954.122
In 1887, California funded a workshop, the Industrial Home of
Mechanic Trades for the Blind in California, which duplicated the
original goal of sheltered workshops in the East, to train people who
were blind for jobs in the mainstream workforce.1 23 Several years
later, the Governor of California announced that this goal also
failed.
124
But the concept of workshops as providing both training and long-
term employment centers remained and was perpetuated through
116. NATHAN NELSON, WORKSHOPS FOR THE HANDICAPPED IN THE UNITED STATES: AN HISTORICAL
AND DEVELOPMENTAL PERSPECTIVE 7 (1971).
117. Id. at 8.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 26-28.
120. Id. at 26.
121. Id. at 8.
122. NELSON, supra note 116, at 27.
123. Id. at 28.
124. Id. at 28-29; see also Jonathan C. Drimmer, Cripples, Overcomers and Civil Rights: Tracing the
Evolution of Federal Legislation and Social Policy for People with Disabilities, 40 UCLA L. REV 134 1,
1363-66 (1993).
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independent, stand-alone workshops such as the Pennsylvania
Working Home for Blind Men, which opened in 1874.125 Over time,
sheltered workshops became indelibly associated with the premise
and principle that people who worked in them were so severely
handicapped that they were incapable of being trained to work in the
competitive workforce. 126 Later, the idea that the people in these
workshops were in need of shelter or protection also developed: in
1915, the first sheltered workshops for people with tuberculosis was
opened in New York, to give them work in a more protected and less
pressured setting.' 
27
Thus, when injured World War I and World War II veterans
spurred the development of vocational rehabilitation, the concept of
rehabilitating veterans with injuries and amputations to return them to
the competitive workforce, developed for many years in a parallel
track and without reference to sheltered workshops.' 28 While the first
federal vocational rehabilitation act was passed in 1918 to assist
injured soldiers returning from World War I, and these services were
expanded in 1920 to the civilian population, the services
contemplated did not include sheltered workshops, because sheltered
workshops were for people without hope of ever competing
successfully in mainstream employment.'
29
Although today sheltered workshops primarily serve people with
developmental disabilities or mental retardation, this is a relatively
recent occurrence in the history of sheltered workshops. For people
with developmental disabilities, sheltered workshops were the
outgrowth of efforts by parents whose children were excluded from
public school settings.' 30 These programs had added workshop
services starting in the 1950s, 13 1 and the workshops quickly came to
125. NELSON, supra note 116, at28.
126. Id. at 17.
127. Id. at 15.
128. Smith-Sears Vocational Rehabilitation Act of 1918, ch. 107,40 Stat. 617.
129. The Smith-Sears Vocational Rehabilitation Act, id., did not apply by its terms to civilians; the
Smith-Fess Act expanded vocational services to disabled civilians. Ch. 219, 41 Stat. 735 (1920).
130. NELSON, supra note 116, at 11.
131. The workshop established by the King's County, Washington branch of United Cerebral Palsy in
1952 was one of the first workshops of its kind for individuals with cerebral palsy, while San Francisco
Aid Retarded Children opened its workshop doors in 1951. See NELSON, supra note 116, at 21;
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dominate these programs. 32 Just as parent-run workshops
proliferated, public schools began to accept disabled students.' 33
Schools slowly phased in the enrollment of children with mental
retardation, however, taking students with the most academic
potential first while leaving behind those with the least. 134 Parent
programs responded by shifting their focus to serve individuals with
more severe mental retardation. 135 These students began to reach the
limits of their educational abilities and the sheltered workshop
programs added paid work and social opportunities.' 36 At many
parent-run workshops the educational functions essentially ceased,
leaving a workshop for the mentally retarded. 137 Such workshops
received a significant financial boost from grants under the
Amendments, and workshops for people with mental retardation
became the largest type of sheltered workshop in the U.S. 138
Although the Javits-Wagner-O'DayAct results in billions of dollars
flowing into workshops,' 39 and some workshop workers are receiving
minimum wage or better, many workers continue to receive sub-
minimum wages. 140 The salaries of workshop CEOs, however, are a
different matter. In March 2006, the Oregonian newspaper broke a
scandal of executive abuses of JWOD sub-contract funds at
EMPLOYMENT & TRAINING ADMIN., DEP'T OF LABOR, SHELTERED WORKSHOP STUDY: A NATIONWIDE
REPORT ON SHELTERED WORKSHOPS AND THEIR EMPLOYMENT OF HANDICAPPED INDIVIDUALS I I
(1977) [hereinafter SHELTERED WORKSHOP STUDY].




136. See SHELTERED WORKSHOP STUDY, supra note 131.
137. Id.
138. NELSON, supra note 116, at 17.
139. See ACQUISITION & TECHNOLOGY, THE ABILITYONE PROGRAM (2009),
http://www.abilityone.gov/documents/ATAbilityOne Info Sheet.pdf [hereinafter ABILITYONE INFO
SHEET] (explaining that the Department of Defense alone procured more than $1.5 billion of goods and
services in fiscal year 2008).
140. JOHN BUTTERWORTH, FRANK A. SMITH, ALLISON C. HALL, ALBERTO MIGLIORE & JEAN E.
WINSOR, INST. FOR COMMUNITY INCLUSION (UCEDD), STATEDATA: THE NATIONAL REPORT ON
EMPLOYMENT SERVICES AND OUTCOMES (2008), available at http://www.communityinclusion.org/
pdf/statedatabookF.pdf [hereinafter STATEDATA]; see also David Mank, Andrea Cioffi & Paul
Yovanoff, Supported Employment Outcomes Across a Decade: Is There Evidence of Improvement in
Quality of Implementation?, 41 MENTAL RETARDATION 188 (2003).
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nonprofits. 141 While most of the 45,000 workers with disabilities
working at the time on JWOD contracts earned less than the federal
minimum wage, and the national average salary for a nonprofit
executive was $126,000,142 many sheltered workshop CEOs were
earning upwards of $350,000 a year. 143 Robert E. Jones, CEO of the
Texas workshop the National Center for the Employment of the
Disabled (NCED), the largest JWOD contractor, claimed not to
receive a salary, but his consulting company was paid $4.6 million,
loaned another $1.6 million, and pledged assets in exchange for
discounted CEO Lear jet travel. 144 Another CEO was paid $715,000
per year.145  When the abuses came to light, lawsuits and arrests
followed. Jones settled a lawsuit with the NCED in 2007 for
allegedly defrauding them of $13 million, and in 2008 was arrested
by the FBI on charges of fraud and embezzlement.
146
The Oregonian investigation followed the October 2005 Senate
Health, Education, Labor and Pensions (HELP) Committee hearings
on the same issue. 147 According to the Committee's findings, the
Javits-Wagner-O'Day Act resulted in undesirable employment
outcomes for its workers and enabled excessive compensation,
perquisites, and self-dealing for its executives. 148 According to the
Committee's report, a desirable employment outcome is competitive
placement for workers, but the JWOD program creates jobs for
persons with disabilities while increasing incentives to keep
productive workers in a workshop. 14 In 2004, the JWOD program
141. Special Coverage, Charity Series, http://blog.oregonlive.com/oregonianspecial/charity_
series/index.html (last visited Mar. 13, 2010).
142. Dave Reynolds, Federal Programs Help Executives, Fail Workers with Disabilities, RAGGED
EDGE ONLINE, Oct. 26, 2005, available at http://www.raggededgemagazine.com/ departments/
closerlook/000567.html.
143. Jeff Kosseff, Bryan Denson & Les Zaitz, Charity Leaders Prosper as "Disabled" Is Redefined,
OREGONIAN, Mar. 5,2006, at A01, available at 2006 WLNR 3741352.
144. HELP Hearing, supra note 15, at 11, 12.
145. Id.
146. Bryan Denson, GAO: Jobs Act Needs Oversight, OREGONIAN, Jan. 30, 2007, at A01, available at
2007 WL 1838013.
147. HELP Hearing, supra note 15, at 11, 12.
148. Id.
149. Id at 10.
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increased jobs for individuals with disabilities by 22% but its
placement rate fell to a low of 5.2%.150
Particularly noteworthy was the Committee's finding that the
Javits-Wagner-O'Day program does not fulfill congressional intent as
evidenced by the ADA and Rehabilitation Act, which promote
integration of individuals with disabilities.' 51 The Committee found
that Javits-Wagner-O'Day should increase competitive employment
opportunities and increase oversight on how JWOD funds are used.1
52
Since the Committee's report, there have been some changes. The
Javits-Wagner-O'Day oversight committee received additional funds
to hire compliance staff. 153 Without significant reform, however, the
JWOD will continue to fail to promote the congressional aim of
competitive placement for sheltered workers while keeping the
current workshop model entrenched in federal law.
3. The Supported Employment Model
First developed in the late 1960s and early 1970s,154 the key
components and values of supported employment are almost
precisely the opposite of the assumptions on which sheltered
workshops operate. These values, as set out in one state policy,
include:
" People with disabilities are capable of being employed.
* People with disabilities who want to work have the
same right to work and earn a living wage as people
who do not have a disability.
" Facilitating community employment allows people
(who have traditionally been excluded from community
life) the fullest community participation.
150. Id.
151. Id. at 12.
152. Id. at 13.
153. Bryan Denson, Congress Aims to Fix Job Program for Disabled, OREGONIAN, Nov. 17, 2006, at
AO1, available at 2006 WLNR 20040173.
154. Joe Marrone & Martine Gold, Supported Employment for People with Mental Illness: Myths &
Facts, J. REHABILITATION, Oct.-Dec. 1994, at 38, available at 1994 WLNR 4950590.
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" People learn a job best on the job, not in simulated
segregated environments.
" Employment options are based upon preferences, skills
and needs of the applicant.
" Jobs may be carved or created to fulfill the specific
needs of an employer and the specific skills of an
employee.
" Employer/employee consultation and support is
provided after a job has been found for as long as the
employer and employee feel it is necessary.
1 55
Supported employment supports workers with disabilities in
integrated environments at minimum wages or better. 156 The entire
focus of supported employment is to locate competitive employment
for their clients and provide them with the support necessary to
perform those jobs, rather than jobs reserved for workers with
disabilities. 5 7 Job placements are the results of individualized
assessments, rather than sheltered workshop contracts. 158 The support
provided is individualized to the client's needs, and, as indicated
above, the support lasts for as long as the client needs it.
159
Beginning in 1986 with amendments to the Rehabilitation Act,
160
the federal government has increasingly funded supported
employment through the Rehabilitation Act.' 6 1 This has continued
with parallel funding of segregated employment through Javits-
155. N.D. DEP'T OF HUMAN RES., NORTH DAKOTA VOCATIONAL REHABILITATION SUPPORTED
EMPLOYMENT GUIDELINES AND PAYMENT RATES (2007), http://www.nd.gov/dhs/rcs/docs/guidelines-
payment-rates.pdf.
156. See U.S. Dep't of Labor, Office of Disability Employment Pol'y, What is Supported
Employment?, http://www.dol.gov/odep/archives/fact/supportd.htm (last visited Feb. 20, 2010)
(defining the supported employment model to include work that is "compensated with the same benefits
and wages as other workers in similar jobs receive").
157. Id. ("Supported employment facilitates competitive work in integrated work settings.").
158. Id.
159. Id; see also Pat Rogan and Stephen Murphy, Supported Employment and Vocational
Rehabilitation: Merger or Misadventure?, J. REHABILITATION, Apr.-June 1991, at 39, available at 1991
WLNR 4401619.
160. Pub. L. No. 99-506, 100 Stat. 1807 (1986).
16 1. See generally STATEDATA, supra note 140.
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Wagner-O'Day.1 62 Congress has recognized that the employment it
funds through JWOD is segregated in various Congressional
documents. 163 The Rehabilitation Act's definition of the recipients of
supported employment services has changed over the years from
"persons with developmental disabilities for whom competitive
employment at or above the minimum wage is unlikely" to
"individuals with severe handicaps for whom competitive
employment has not traditionally occurred." 164
The Javits-Wagner-O'Day Act ensures that sheltered workshops
will remain a multi-billion dollar a year industry, although very
recently the federal oversight agency that distributes JWOD dollars
has started to evolve, passing an aspirational statement that supported
integrated employment and jobs paying the minimum wage or better.
4. Vocational Services for People with Disabilities Today:
Perspective from the States
Sheltered workshops are massively funded by federal government
requirements of federal contractors through Javits-Wagner-O'Day; 165
they are also heavily subsidized by state agencies serving people with
162. See generally ABILITYONE INFO SHEET, supra note 139.
163. See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 105-635 (1998); 134 CONG. REC. E1308 (daily ed. Apr. 22, 1988)
(statement of Rep. Tony Coelho) ("[Wihen prejudice dictates that the handicapped can be productively
employed only in separate sheltered workshops ... ").
164. The definition of "supported employment" in the Rehabilitation Amendments Act of 1984
provides:
Paid employment which (i) is for persons with developmental disabilities for whom
competitive employment at or above the minimum wage is unlikely, and who, because of
their disabilities, need intensive, ongoing support to perform in a work setting; (ii) is
conducted in a variety of settings, particularly work sites in which persons without
disabilities are employed; and (iii) is supported by any activity needed to sustain paid
work by persons with disabilities, including supervision, training, and transportation.
Developmental Disabilities Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-527, 98 Stat. 2662. Compare that definition
with the 1986 reauthorization of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, which also defined the term "supported
employment" but changed the definition to
.. . competitive work in integrated work settings (A) for individuals with severe
handicaps for whom competitive employment has not traditionally occurred, or (B) for
individuals for whom competitive employment has been interrupted or intermittent as a
result of a severe disability, and who, because of their handicap, need ongoing support
services to perform such work.
Rehabilitation Amendments Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-506, § 103, 100 Stat. 1807.
165. ABILITYONE INFO SHEET, supra note 139.
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mental retardation and developmental disabilities using both federal
funds under the Rehabilitation Act and state funds for programs for
people with developmental disability. 166  Many states have, with
greater and lesser degrees of speed and commitment, been evolving
from the sheltered workshop model to the supported employment
model. 167 Studies have shown that when foundations or pilot
programs have been established to assist the transition from sheltered
workshops to more innovative and integrated approaches, the
sheltered workshop staff have resisted the change in culture.'68
Nevertheless, many states have made substantial progress.
Vermont banned the use of state funds to support sheltered
workshops in the late 1990s.' 69 Some states have cut back on
sheltered workshop funding during the fiscal crises of 2008-2009.170
Almost every state except Vermont continues to fund and subsidize
sheltered workshops, especially in conjunction with other segregated
habilitation and residential programs.17 1 For example, in New York,
[t]here are currently 52,229 individuals enrolled in segregated
employment programs, including sheltered workshops, through
OMRDD [Office of Mental Retardation and Developmental
Disability] alone, with a total cost to the state of more than $1
billion. The cost per person in a segregated program is $21,309
compared to $5,291 per person in supported employment.
72
A number of states, including Washington, Colorado, and New
Mexico have embarked on initiatives to broaden supported
166. See generally STATEDATA, supra note 140.
167. See Alison Cohen Hall, John Butterworth, Dana Scott Gilmore & Deborah Metzel, High-
Performing States in Integrated Employment, INST. FOR COMMUNITY INCLUSION, Feb. 2003,
http://www.communityinclusion.org/article.phparticle-id = 121.
168. E.g., Albert Migliore, Teresa Grossi, David Mank & Patricia Rogan, Why do Adults with
Intellectual Disabilities Work in Sheltered Workshops?, 28 J. VOCATIONAL REHABILITATION 29 (2008).
169. See STATEDATA, supra note 140, at 305.
170. See generally id.
171. See generally id.
172. N.Y. ASS'N ON INDEP. LIVING, 2009 DISABILITY PRIORrrY AGENDA, http://www.docstoc.con/
docs/24291920/Disability-Priority-Agenda---New-York-Association-on-Independent (last visited Feb.
20, 2010).
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employment.' 73 Other states, including, Arizona, Colorado, Montana,
and Nevada, have mandated that sheltered workshop employees be
paid the minimum wage. 174  Although the use of supported
employment is increasing, the use of sheltered workshops is not
necessarily decreasing to correspond with the increase in use of
supported employment.
As part of this article, we surveyed, either through email or
telephone interviews with staff, or through email requests which
resulted in mailings of relevant material, State staff in Alaska,
California, Hawaii, Idaho, Indiana, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland,
Massachusetts, Minnesota, Mississippi, Montana, Nebraska, New
Mexico, North Dakota, Oregon, Mississippi, Washington, West
Virginia and Wyoming. 175 All of these states continue to have at
least some sheltered or segregated employment services for people
with disabilities. 176 Idaho was most explicit about greater funding for
173. John Butterworth & Alison Cohen Hall, Innovations in Employment Supports: Washington
State's Division of Developmental Disabilities, INSTITUTE FOR COMMUNITY INCLUSION, (Aug. 2003),
www.communityinclusion.org/article.php?articleid=140; Jean E. Winsor, John Butterworth & Alison
Cohen Hall, Innovations in Employment Supports: Colorado's State Division of Developmental
Services, (July 2005), www.communityinclusion.org/article.php?articleid=160&type=topic&id=4.
174. Catherine Komp, Groups Clash over Ariz. Minimum-Wage Exemption, NEWSTANDARD, Jan. 4,
2007, available at http://newstandardnews.net/content/index.cfm/items/4044. See Ariz. Office of the
Attorney General, Ariz. Op. Att'y Gen. 107-002 (R06-039) (Feb. 7, 2007), available at
www.azag.gov/opinionsl2007/107-002.pdf ("Proposition 202 (Minimum Wage Law) and the Disabled
Worker").
175. Telephone and E-mail Interviews with Donna Ashworth, West Virginia (July 24, 2009); Chris
Anthony, Louisiana, Rehabilitation Services Bureau Administration (July 22, 2009); Lynn K.K.
Fischer, Idaho, Extended Employment Services Specialist (July 21, 2009); Susan Foard, Hawaii,
Vocational Rehabilitation Assistant Administrator (July 20, 2009); Frank C. Lloyd, Assistant
Commissioner, Vocational Rehabilitation, Nebraska (July 20, 2009); Jim McIntosh, Wyoming (July 20,
2009); Gary Neely, Mississippi Department Rehabilitative Services (July 20, 2009); David A. Rees,
Indiana, Social Services Coordinator, JRDS (Jan. 13, 2010); Lynnae M. Rutledge, Director of the
Washington Division of Vocational Rehabilitation (July 21, 2009); John Sherman, Minnesota,
Rehabilitation Services, Department of Employment and Economic Development (July 21-22, 2009);
Jean Updike, Director of Employment (July 21, 2009); and Ronald C. Winter, M. Ed., Director, Office
of Field Services, Division of Rehabilitation Services, Maryland (July 21, 2009); Stephanie Parrish
Taylor, Administrator, Office of Vocational Rehabilitation Services, Department of Human Services,
Oregon (July 21, 2009), and Charles W. Leggate of Montana Vocational Rehabilitation (July 24, 2009).
Staff in Alaska, California, New Mexico, Kentucky and North Dakota sent state policy and regulatory
materials by email, which are cited herein as a response to questions. Staff in Washington, Minnesota
and Indiana sent materials and also gave generously of their time in answering questions. Email
responses are on file with the author.
176. Sources supra note 175.
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sheltered workshops than supported employment,1 77 because, staff
maintained, the client and family preferred what they called "work
services" (sheltered employment). 178  This opinion is in marked
contrast to the results of a 2007 survey on the work environment
preferences of adults with intellectual disabilities in nineteen different
workshops. 179  Seventy-four percent of the 210 people surveyed
would prefer or be interested in competitive employment.' 
80
In Minnesota, a few clients are described as "grandfathered" into
sheltered employment because they were working in sheltered
employment prior to changes in the statutory mandate of vocational
rehabilitation agencies to serve clients primarily through supported
employment services. 181 In Minnesota, an individual can combine
both supported and sheltered employment, e.g. have a ten to twelve
hour competitive job and use center-based work for more hours.' 82
One of the chief problems that emerged in these interviews was the
common assertion that "anyone in supported employment must have
long term financial supports from a county service (i.e. Medicaid
waiver services) for us to agree to supported employment."'
' 83
Because supported employment services funded by vocational
rehabilitation funds are limited to eighteen months,' 84 if it is obvious
that an individual will need supports for longer than eighteen months,
many state staff we interviewed stated explicitly
85 or implicitly 186
177. "We rarely authorize more than a maximum of 20 hours per month supported employment or 25
hours per week for sheltered employment." E-mail from Lynn K.K. Fischer, Extended Employment
Services Specialist (July 22, 2009) (emphasis added).
178. The reason that clients preferred sheltered workshops were "working with friends, people they
know through school and residential settings, regular and consistent schedule (Monday to Friday, 9-3
with weekends off), unlike much integrated employment, the sheltered workshop provides transportation
and closer supervision, no site development is required so they can start sooner, and the job environment
is more stable with less staff turnover. Communication with Lynn K.K. Fisher, supra note 177.
179. Alberto Migliore, David Mank, Teresa Grossi & Patricia Rogan, Integrated Employment or
Sheltered Workshops: Preferences of Adults with Intellectual Disabilities, Their Families, and Staff, 26
J. VOCATIONAL REHABILITATION 5, 12 (2007).
180. Id.
181. Communication with John Sherman, supra note 175.
182. Id.
183. Id. This was explicitly supported by almost every other respondent to the survey.
184. 34 C.F.R. § 361.5(b)(54)(i) (2009).
185. In response to the question, "Are there any other criteria for supported employment?" the
Mississippi staff person stated, "Well, as long as you meet the requirements under the regulations. One
of them is that you must have a third party provider who will continue the supports after the VR case is
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that such individuals would not be considered for supported
employment unless they were receiving Medicaid-waiver services
that could continue to supply needed supports after VR funding
terminated. Since the federal-state Vocational Rehabilitation program
does not permit states to use federal funds for individuals who will
need ongoing support after placement, individuals who are not likely
to have those ongoing supports are often turned away from supported
employment.' 
87
Other commonly cited problems by staff were finding supported
employment placements (Oregon), 188  the continuing bias of
rehabilitation counselors toward sheltered employment (Minnesota)
and the fact that even integrated jobs pay so little that they do not
enable people to support themselves in independent, integrated
residential settings (Minnesota). 189
Problems that emerged strikingly and consistently from the
interview process were definitions or examples of integrated
employment that sounded quite segregated, for example, in
Washington, someone working alone as a janitor after hours in an
empty building, or working by himself on a farm is considered to be
engaged in integrated employment, 19 whereas in Virginia "supported
employment" included "supported employment crews, enclaves, and
closed. Services cannot begin without that up front. Sometimes that provider is not available. Most states
are having problems with that issue .... Keep in mind that funds for supported employment are limited
due to the limited funds in the SE grant." In Washington, criteria for supported employment include "the
availability of long-term support to assist the customer in maintaining their employment." Email from
Lynnae M. Rutledge, supra note 175; see also Email from David A. Rees, supra note 175.
186. For example, in Washington, services called "extended services" are defined as "support services
provided once the customer is stabilized on the job and DVR services are no longer needed to maintain
satisfactory on-the-job performance. Extended services consist of specific services needed to maintain
the customer in supported employment." WASH. DIVISION OF VOCATIONAL REHAB., CLIENT SERVICES
MANUAL ON SUPPORTED EMPLOYMENT, SUPPORTED EMPLOYMENT DEFINITIONS [hereinafter CLIENT
SERVICES MANUAL].
187. 34 C.F.R. § 361.5(b)(54)(i) (2009); see E-mail from Lynnae M. Rutledge, supra note 175; E-
Mail from David A. Rees, supra note 175.
188. Personal Communication from Stephanie Parrish Taylor, Administrator, Office of Vocational
Rehabilitation Services, Department of Human Services, Oregon (July 21, 2009).
189. Personal communication from John Sherman, supra note 175.
190. CLIENT SERVICES MANUAL, supra note 186.
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facility-based integrated settings."191 In Montana "supported
employment" includes enclaves. 1
92
II. CHALLENGES TO SEGREGATED EMPLOYMENT SERVICES UNDER
TITLE II OF THE ADA
Most sheltered workshops are operated by private non-profit
agencies. 193 But all are enabled to operate by the state agencies which
contract with them and provide them with funding from a
combination of state and federal sources, as well as the contracts
mandated by federal law.194 As in the DAI v. Paterson case, the best
way to challenge the continued operation of segregated vocational
settings is not to challenge any individual sheltered workshop or set
of workshops, but to challenge the state policies and practices that
fund unnecessarily segregated vocational services when people with
disabilities would prefer to be involved in integrated supported
employment programs.
As noted in the introduction, only one case has ever challenged a
public entity for its funding of sheltered workshops. 195 But a number
of older federal cases contemplated that a move from sheltered
workshops to supported employment would be required by Section
504 and/or the ADA. In Homeward Bound v. Hissom, the judge
ordered the State of Oklahoma to develop supported employment
options for plaintiffs as part of the remedy.' 96 More than fifteen years
191. "Facility-based integrated settings" is, in many, ways an oxymoronic term.
192. See Montana Department of Public Health and Human Services website, Supported Employment
Services, http://www.dphhs.mt.gov/dsd/workandotherdayservices/supportedemploymentservices.shtm
(last visited Jan. 22, 2010).
193. See Fact Sheet for AbilityOne, http://www.abilityone.org/media%20room/fact-sheet.html (last
visited Mar. 1, 2010) ("The AbilityOne program uses the purchasing power of the Federal Government
to buy products and services from participating community-based non-profit agencies dedicated to
training and employing individuals with disabilities.").
194. STATEDATA, supra note 140, at 10 (noting that "[s]tate ... agencies remain the primary source
of long-term funding" for employment services for intellectually and developmentally disabled
individuals, and Medicaid is "the largest federal source of funding for day and employment services
under the Home and Community Based Services Waiver program").
195. Schwartz v. Jefferson County, No. 2004CV000091 (Jefferson County Cir. Ct. Feb. 24, 2004).
Complaint and Motion for Class Certification on file with the author.
196. Homeward Bound v. Hissom Mem'l Ctr., No. 85-C-437-E, 1987 WL 27104 (N.D. Okla. July 24,
1987).
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ago, the court in ARC v. Schaefer found that "[i]nstances of
segregation do exist in sheltered workshops, whose place in the
paradigm is being phased out."'
197
Sheltered workshops are not a unique and necessary component of
a state's vocational service system for people with disabilities. Many
states have been trying to phase out segregated work environments,
although success has been more limited in some states than others.'
98
Both the federal government and the states have articulated for over a
decade the principle that people with disabilities will be provided
services in the most integrated setting appropriate to their needs, in
response to decades of research and recommendations to phase out
sheltered workshops by a number of scholars and policymakers in the
field, including the National Council on Disability.'99 Research also
indicates that most people with disabilities, offered the choice, would
prefer to receive supported employment services than work in
sheltered workshops.
20 0
A. People Who Work in Sheltered Workshops and Seek Supported
Employment Services Are Disabled
The identity, number, and legal status of plaintiffs are key to any
litigation challenging sheltered workshops, as well as the definition
of the plaintiff class, if any. There are a number of options regarding
the identity of plaintiffs: an organizational plaintiff, by itself, as in
DA1 v. Paterson;20 1 an organizational plaintiff plus individual
197. ARC v. Schaefer, 872 F. Supp. 689, 706 (D.N.D. 1995).
198. For example, Vermont has phased out state funding of sheltered workshops entirely. See
STATEDATA, supra note 140 at 18 & tbl.5. Compare to Missouri, which is increasing funding for
sheltered workshops to 24.8 million dollars in its 2010 budget. In Missouri, ninety-three sheltered
workshops employ 7,500 clients. First Lady Visits Sheltered Workshops, Jan. 30, 2009,
http://firstlady.mo.gov/newsroom/ 2009fFirstLadyvisits shelteredworkshops.
States which are making concerted efforts to increase supported employment services and decrease
sheltered workshops include Washington and Connecticut. See STATEDATA, supra note 140.
199. NAT'L COUNCIL ON DISABILITY, ACHIEVING INDEPENDENCE: THE CHALLENGE FOR THE
TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY (1996), http://www.ncd.gov/newsroom/publications/1996/achieving.htm.
200. Migliore et al., supra note 179, at 12.
201. Disability Advocates, Inc. v. Paterson (DA/ 1), 598 F. Supp. 2d 289, 307-10 (E.D.N.Y. 2009)
(finding that DAI could bring the action without establishing that any of its constituents suffered harm or
were qualified for supported housing).
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plaintiffs, a plaintiff class, 202 or a discrete number of individual
plaintiffs.2 °3
There appears to be little controversy that individuals served by
sheltered workshops are "disabled" under the Americans with
Disabilities Act. Their very placement in a sheltered workshop setting
is the result of an assessment and conclusion by state professionals
that they are substantially limited in the major life activity of
working.204 Whether this perception is correct or is the product of
disability discrimination is at the core of an ADA challenge to public
entity funding of sheltered workshops, rather than supported
employment for the named plaintiffs or (in the case of an
organizational plaintiff) the plaintiff's constituents.
B. Sheltered Workshop Clients Are Qualified for Supported
Employment
Title I claims require that plaintiffs are not only be disabled but
also "qualified" for the services they seek.20 5 This is the same as the
integration regulation's limitation that the disabled person is entitled
to receive services in the integrated setting most appropriate to the
needs of that individual.20 6 The Court in Olmstead held that states
were entitled to rely on the reasonable judgments of state
202. See Messier v. Southbury Training School, 562 F. Supp. 2d 294 (D.Conn. 2008), a case which
included a challenge to the exclusion of the plaintiff class from integrated employment services; and
Jackson v. Fort Stanton Hosp. and Training Sch., 964 F. 2d 980 (10th Cir. 1992) ( In Jackson, the
settlement agreement required measurement of the number of class members receiving integrated
vocational services).
203. See Schwartz v. Jefferson County, No. 2004CV000091 (Jefferson County Cir. Ct. Feb. 24,
2004). The attorney in the Schwartz case began with four plaintiffs. One was working at a chicken farm
sorting eggs, and could have worked more hours if the county had been willing to fund more hours of
job support; she and another plaintiff developed medical problems that prevented them from working at
all. Another plaintiff moved out of the county, leaving a single remaining plaintiff whose requests were
accommodated by the county in a settlement, mooting the case. E-mail from Robert Pledl, Esq. , civil
rights attorney, Pledl & Cohn, Milwaukee, Wisconsin (Mar. 30, 2010).
204. ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, § 4(a)(2)(A), 122 Stat. 3553, 3555
(amending the ADA to include working as a major life activity). Note that some courts have raised
questions about whether "working" should be considered a major life activity in Title I cases but that
these courts are in the minority and that this question arises only in Title I cases in any event.
205. 42 U.S.C. § 12131(2) (2006).
206. DAI I, 598 F. Supp. 2d at 319 (finding the two elements to be the same).
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professionals as to whether a prospective plaintiff was qualified for
the integrated services he or she sought.2 °7
But these judgments must actually be reasonable and based on
professional assessment rather than simply the exigencies of available
services or other pressures. Several courts have held that plaintiffs
were entitled to show that a state professional's judgment was not
based on clinical factors.
20 8
As noted above, many state vocational rehabilitation agencies
automatically disqualify individuals from even being considered for
supported employment unless they are covered by a government
program or have family that will continue to provide the necessary
funding or support for supported employment after the eighteen
month limitation on vocational rehabilitation funding of supported
employment services has expired. Most state vocational rehabilitation
employees interviewed for this article clearly believed that an
individual was not "qualified" for supported employment unless he or
she had extended service support available through Medicaid or other
state or natural supports. This has nothing to do with an individual's
actual ability to work in mainstream employment with the help of a
job coach or other support. Rather, as in the case of Helen L. v.
DiDario, it is a problem with different silos of state funding, where
the funding for integrated services is insufficient compared to the
disproportionate funding for segregated services.
209
Professionals can and do disagree on assessments of the
capabilities and qualifications of individuals with disabilities. If the
professionals with whom the state contracted to provide supported
employment were asked to assess prospective clients, their responses
regarding the appropriateness of those clients for integrated services
might be substantially different from the responses of state vocational
rehabilitation or state mental retardation professionals.
210
207. Olmstead v. L.C., 527 U.S. 581,602 (1999).
208. Messier v. Southbury Training Sch., 562 F. Supp. 2d 294 (D. Conn. 2008); Kathleen S. V. Dep't
of Pub. Welfare of Pa., 10 F. Supp. 2d 460 (E.D. Pa. 1998); Charles Q. v. Houstoun, No. 1:CV-95-280,
1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21671 (M.D. Pa. Apr. 22, 1996).
209. Helen L. v. DiDario, 46 F.3d 325 (3d Cir. 1995).
210. Migliore et al., supra note 179 (professionals tend to discourage integrated employment option
and encourage sheltered workshops).
[Vol. 26:3
HeinOnline -- 26 Ga. St. U. L. Rev. 912 2009-2010
912  TE I ERSITY  I  ( l. :  
i ls r tive l i tiff   r 
r ted    207 
t  ts   l    
i l t r    l  
.  rt     
 itl   l's t   
 li i l factors?OS 
 ,  ti l ti  i s 
ll   l      
t  t   t 
    
 rt  t  
 ilit ti    
t   l ti  
 i e     
l i d" t    
 t l l   i    
l  i idual's 
    
   
i ario,    
      t    
t  funding for segregated services.2 9 
l     
     
    
 
  
  l         
or state ental retardation professionals.2lo 
SI, ). 
S t r .,   . S v. 't 
 . lf r  fP .,  . .   ( . . . ); rl  . . t , . I:C - - S , 
 . . .   . . . . ,199  
. . i , .  
.  t I., pra t   l  t  t    l    
38
Georgia State University Law Review, Vol. 26, Iss. 3 [2010], Art. 12
https://readingroom.law.gsu.edu/gsulr/vol26/iss3/12
BEYOND RESIDENTIAL SEGREGATION
Another issue when considering a case involving a large number of
people is whether each and every one of them has to show that he or
she is qualified for the services sought. A number of courts have held
that plaintiffs in class actions need not make this showing. 21 1 In the
remedial order in Disability Advocates Inc v. Paterson, the judge
explicitly found that all adult home residents were entitled to be
212
served in supported housing.
In fact, the very essence of the philosophy of supported
employment is that all or virtually all people with disabilities can be
served by supported employment programs. From this perspective,
the way to show that a group of plaintiffs was "qualified" or that
defendants' judgment that they were not qualified was unreasonable,
is to show that no material difference exists between the population
of people served by sheltered workshops and those served in
supported employment, which can be done by evaluating
scientifically valid samples of each group.213 This argument would be
not so much about the qualifications of the plaintiffs but the
flexibility and scope of supported employment services, which have
since the late 1970s served extremely disabled individuals, including
people just like those currently marooned in the segregated setting of
sheltered workshops.2 14
Defendants in DAI v. Paterson also argued that an individual could
not be "qualified" to receive supported housing unless he or she had
applied for it.215 This argument was soundly rejected by the court,
211. E.g., Disability Advocates, Inc. v. Paterson (DAI 1), 598 F. Supp. 2d 289 (E.D.N.Y. 2009);
Joseph S. v. Hogan, 561 F. Supp. 2d 280 (E.D.N.Y. 2008).
212. Order, Disability Advocates Inc. v. Paterson, No. 03-CV-3209, available at
www.bazelon.org/incourt/docket/DAl/DAlOrderon remedy3-1-10.pdf. See also, supra discussion at
notes 100-101.
213. There has been repeated concern in the research literature that groups of individuals in supported
employment are different demographically from individuals in sheltered workshops, and there do appear
to be some distinctions between the two groups. JOHN KREGEL & DAVID H. DEAN, SHELTERED VS.
SUPPORTED EMPLOYMENT: A DIRECT COMPARISON OF LONG-TERM EARNINGS INCOME FOR
INDIVIDUALS WITH COGNITIVE DISABILITIES, http://www.worksupport.com/main/downloads/dean/
shelteredchap3.pdf (last visited Mar. 25, 2010). But a number of researchers have done research with
great pains to ensure that the samples were demographically similar.
214. Pat Rogan & Stephen Murphy, Supported Employment and Vocational Rehabilitation: Merger
or Misadventure?, J. REHABILITATION, Apr.-June 1991, at 39, available at 1991 WLNR 4401619.
215. DAlI, 598 F. Supp. 2d 289.
20101
HeinOnline -- 26 Ga. St. U. L. Rev. 913 2009-2010
] D I E TIAL I  913 
r  i ring   i    r f 
l  t r         r 
   r  t   
     t  ?l   
l  lit   rson,  
tl       
· d h . 212  m t  m  
     il    
t t l  it  liti s   
   l ent    ti , 
   lified"   
ts' t i  m  
    
      
 t,     
ll    U .213  t  
  ti s    
   t  t ,   
 l    
  l      
 ps.214 
   son   
 i    
 215    
  il I)  
.    
 ilable  




    I  . ,  . 
: I   loNG-     
, rt. l ainldownloadsldeanl 
  
 t  l   i ll  i il . 
.    t  , rt  l t  ti nal ilitation: r r 
r isadventure?, , , t  vailable t   
i 1,5  . .  . 
39
Stefan: Beyond Residential Segregation:  The Application of Olmstead to S
Published by Reading Room, 2010
GEORGIA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
which noted that most residents of adult homes were never informed
that they had any choice about where they lived, were never provided
with either information about alternatives or the opportunity to apply
for any alternatives, 21 6 and that most, if not all, adult home residents
could be served in supported housing. 217 In fact, the court found,
"[a]pproved HRA [supported housing] applications are an
inappropriate measure of how many Adult Home residents are
qualified for supported housing because of the inability of many
residents to meaningfully utilize the HRA process, ' 218 which is
unnecessarily complicated and was designed to be filled out by
agencies rather than individuals.219 Many individuals with disabilities
may not ask for supported employment services because they are not
aware of them, or because they are not aware that they have any
choices as to the vocational services that they are entitled to receive.
The remedial order in Disability Advocates Inc. v. Paterson included
an order for "in-reach" to educate residents of adult homes about
their choices for residential services; 22 similar education would have
to accompany any challenge to segregated vocational services.
Finally, the qualification standards themselves may be
discriminatory. 2 21 In many cases, people with severe disabilities will
not have been offered and declined supported employment, but will
have been excluded from consideration for reasons unrelated to their
ability to benefit from supported employment, e.g. not having
Medicaid benefits that would get them beyond the eighteen months
that vocational rehabilitation would fund supported employment. 222
The qualification standards may, in fact, constitute "administrative
216. Id. at 319-20.
217. DA11, 598 F. Supp. 2d 289.
218. Disability Advocates, Inc. v. Paterson (DA If1), 653 F. Supp. 2d 184,255 (E.D.N.Y. 2009).
219. Id.
220. See Disability Advocates Inc. v. Paterson, No. 03-CV-3209, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17949,
(E.D.N.Y. Mar. 1, 2010) (DAI III); Order, Disability Advocates Inc. v. Paterson, No. 03-CV-3209,
available at www.bazelon.org/incourt/docket/DAI/DAlOrder on remedy3-l-10.pdf.
221. 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(b)(8) (2009) ("A public entity shall not impose or apply eligibility criteria
that screen out or tend to screen out an individual with a disability or any class of individuals with
disabilities from fully and equally enjoying any service, program, or activity, unless such criteria can be
shown to be necessary for the provision of the service, program, or activity being offered.")
222. See interviews, supra note 175.
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methods" which result in disparate exclusion of individuals with
disabilities in violation of the ADA, a discrete claim from an
Olmstead claim.
223
Other eligibility requirements for supported employment
discriminate on the basis of a person's medical disabilities, or
severity of disability, excluding people because of needs for various
kinds of medical supports during a work day. These eligibility
requirements violate the ADA if a disabled person could in fact
perform the employment with reasonable accommodations.224 These
eligibility limitations are similar to eligibility limitations successfully
attacked in other cases.
225
C. Individuals in Sheltered Workshops Do Not Oppose Placement in
Supported Employment
In analyzing the integration mandate claim in Olmstead, the Court
repeatedly invoked the phrase that the plaintiffs did not "oppose such
treatment [in the community]": 226  an interesting phrase to use
regarding plaintiffs asserting a specific claim for community services.
In DAI v. Paterson, part of the court's resolution of defendant's
argument that residents of impacted adult homes did not apply for
supported housing227 was that "as a whole" the majority of impacted
adult home residents "were not opposed" to moving to more
integrated settings.
228
223. 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(b)(3)(i) (2009) ("A public entity may not, directly or through contractual or
other arrangements, utilize criteria or methods of administration that have the effect of subjecting
qualified individuals with disabilities to discrimination on the basis of disability .... ").
224. Discrimination based on severity of disability is prohibited under both section 504 of the
Rehabilitation Act and the Americans with Disabilities Act. Messier v. Southbury Training Sch., 916 F.
Supp. 133, 140 (D. Conn. 1996).
225. See Arc of Wash. State, Inc. v. Braddock, 427 F.3d 615 (9th Cir. 2005) (rejecting claim to
expand community service program and distinguishing the case of Townsend v. Quasim, 328 F.3d 511
(9th Cir. 2003), because it sought only to change the method of eligibility determination rather than
increasing the size of the integrated program, and noting this interferes less with the operation of the
state).
226. At various points in the decision, Justice Ginsberg referred to the requirement that "the transfer
from institutional care to a less restrictive setting is not opposed by the affected individual." Olmstead v.
L.C., 527 U.S. 581, 587 (1999). "[N]either woman opposed such treatment." Id. at. 603. "[T]he affected
persons do not oppose such treatment." Id. at 607.
227. DAI I, 653 F. Supp. 2d at 204-08.
228. Id. at 222.
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The issue of informing individuals about their available choices
prior to asserting that a segregated setting represents the individual's
choice has been addressed by more than one court.229 In practice,
individuals do not choose their services and the settings in which
those services are received; state professionals make those choices,
often based more on the availability of the services than on what
would best serve the individual's needs.230  To interpret the
individual's acquiescence to segregated services as choice when he or
she has not been informed of more integrated alternatives is legally
unacceptable under the integration mandate. A federal district court
in Connecticut held that the defendant cannot assert that an individual
has chosen a segregated option until and unless it has first offered the
individual the integrated option and had that offer rejected; reliance
on the individual's acquiescence could not be taken as indicative of
preference. 231 The court held that any argument that a disabled person
preferred a segregated service was an affirmative defense, and the
burden was on the defendant to prove it.
232
As noted above, it is obvious that the preferences of people with
disabilities are central to Title II claims regarding integrated services.
Depending on whether there is a plaintiff class and how it is defined,
plaintiff counsel may not know that each and every individual
covered by the complaint wants or prefers supported employment.
While research shows that people with disabilities themselves would
prefer to work in integrated setting,233 attorneys in a case seeking
more integrated vocational services should anticipate potential
opposition from parents or guardians who wish these entities to
remain viable. While at least two courts have held that a guardian's
desire that a person remain in an institution was insufficient to keep
229. Disability Advocates, Inc. v. Paterson (DA/ 1), 598 F. Supp. 2d 289 (E.D.N.Y. 2009); Messier,
562 F. Supp. 2d 294.
230. DAlI, 598 F. Supp. 2d 289.
231. Messier, 562 F. Supp. 2d 294, 323 (stating that if plaintiffs are able to satisfy the elements of 42
U.S.C. § 12132 or section 504, the defendants may rebut by producing evidence that they offered
appropriate community placements or vocational services to STS residents but those residents exercised
their statutory right to decline).
232. Id.
233. Mank, supra note 53; Migliore et al., supra note 179.
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that person there when State professionals had decided to discharge
the person or close the institution,2 34 the thorny question of whose
preferences and choices matter for purposes of asserting legal rights
is one that has occurred in Olmstead litigation involving people with
developmental disabilities.235
The best way to resolve this issue may be the approach taken by
the court in its remedial order in DAI v. Paterson: assume that all
persons in segregated settings are entitled to be served in more
integrated settings, order the development of sufficient integrated
settings to provide true choice, and provide for "in-reach" to
determine the actual preferences of individuals when presented with
real choices about the services they are entitled to receive. 236
D. States Discriminate Against Persons with Disabilities by Paying
for Services in Sheltered Workshop Settings When Those Persons
Want and Can Receive Vocational Services in a More Integrated
Setting
1. A Challenge to State Funding of Sheltered Workshops Can Be
Brought Under Title H Even if the Workshops Are Operated by
Private Entities
Although sheltered workshops are generally run by non-profit
rather than public entities, the fact that the public entities2 37 are
paying to provide vocational services in segregated settings makes
them appropriate defendants to claims under both the integration
mandate, 238 and the regulation prohibiting the use of administrative
234. See, e.g., Brown v. Bush, 194 F. App'x 879 (11th Cir. 2006); Richard C. v. Houstoun, No. 89-
2038, U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22172 (W.D. Pa. Sept. 29, 1999).
235. See Brown, 194 F. App'x 879 (denying motion for intervention of parents who opposed
institutional closure); Alexander v. Rendell, 246 F.R.D. 220 (W.D. Pa. 2007).
236. See supra note 100 and accompanying text.
237. See STATEDATA, supra note 140.
238. Disability Advocates, Inc. v. Paterson (DA/ 1), 598 F. Supp. 2d 289, 321 n.36 (E.D.N.Y. 2009)
("[L.C.] received a wide variety of community-care services.., leaving during the day... via public
transportation for persons with disabilities, to attend a daily community-based program that included
social activities, vocational opportunities, and field trips; L.C. returned on the bus each evening to the
institution.").
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methods that discriminate on the basis of disability.239 As in DAI v.
Paterson, the defendants would not be the sheltered workshops
themselves, who are arguably protected under the ADA by language
in the legislative history as offering services to disabled individuals
who might voluntarily choose and prefer them, but the public entities
that, through their financing and budget decisions, constrain or limit
the choices of those people with disabilities who would want more
integrated settings, but must settle for segregation or no services at
all.240
2. Sheltered Workshops Are Not the Most Integrated Setting to
Provide Vocational Services for People with Disabilities
Sheltered Workshop services and settings are segregated. The
Department of Justice, in its regulatory guidance, has construed an
integrated setting as one that "enables individuals with disabilities to
interact with non disabled individuals to the fullest extent
possible."24' Sheltered workshops are by definition "sheltered": the
work takes place in facility- or program-based venues where the only
non-disabled people are those involved in running the workshop.
Sheltered workshops operate in an almost completely segregated
setting, especially as compared with supported employment, which
by definition operates in an integrated work setting.2 42 Even the so-
called enclaves, such as the janitorial units that venture into the
community after working hours, are not integrated with non-disabled
individuals to the maximum extent possible.243
The requirement of the integration mandate is whether plaintiffs
are in "the 'most integrated setting appropriate to their needs' . . . .
Inquiring simply 'whether' individuals with disabilities have any
opportunities for contact with non-disabled persons ignores the 'most
239. 28 C.F.R. § 35.130 (b)(3) (2009).
240. See sources cites infra notes 273, 274 and accompanying text. See also, e.g., DAI v. Paterson,
598 F. Supp. 2d 289, 317-18 (E..D.N.Y.2009); State of Conn. Office of Protection and Advocacy for
Persons with Disabilties v. The State of Conn., No. 3:06CV00179(AWT), 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
31601, at *15 (D.Conn. Mar. 31, 2010).
241. See 28 C.F.R. pt. 35, app. A; 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(d); see also DAII, 598 F. Supp. 2d at 292.
242. See sources cited supra notes 155, 156.
243. See Disability Advocates, Inc. v. Paterson (DAIII), 653 F. Supp. 2d 184, 227 (E.D.N.Y. 2009).
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integrated setting' and the 'fullest extent possible' language of the
regulations."
244
Although the vast majority of applications of the integration
mandate have involved residential settings, including psychiatric
facilities, institutions for people with mental retardation, and nursing
homes, 245 the integration mandate applies to any services provided by
a public entity.246 A number of courts have weighed in on this
question, as summarized by the court in DAI v. Paterson:
Under the applicable standard set forth in the regulations for
what constitutes the "most integrated setting," a plaintiff need
not prove that the setting at issue is an "institution" to establish a
violation of the integration mandate. See Fisher v. Okla. Health
Care Auth., 335 F.3d 1175, 1181 (10th Cir. 2003) (noting that
"there is nothing in the plain language of the regulations that
limits protection to persons who are currently institutionalized"
and "while it is true that the plaintiffs in Olmstead were
institutionalized at the time they brought their claim, nothing in
the Olmstead decision supports a conclusion that
institutionalization is a prerequisite to enforcement of the ADA's
integration requirements."). Rather, a plaintiff must show that the
setting does not "enable interactions with nondisabled persons to
the fullest extent possible." DAI I, 598 F. Supp. 2d at 321; see
also Joseph S., 561 F. Supp. 2d at 289-290 ("A failure to provide
placement in a setting that enables disabled individuals to
interact with non-disabled persons to the fullest extent possible
violates the ADA's integration mandate.") (internal quotation
marks and citation omitted).247
However, the court in DAI also concluded that "whether a
particular setting is an institution is nonetheless a relevant
consideration" and looked more closely at the nature of
244. Id. at 321.
245. See supra notes 3-6.
246. 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(d) (2009).
247. DAIII, 653 F. Supp. 2d at 223.
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institutions.24 8 The court found that adult homes were institutions,
defining institutions as "a segregated setting for a large number of
people that through its restrictive practices and its controls on
individualization and independence limits a person's abilities to
interact with other people who do not have a similar disability.
249
Furthermore, the judge rejected the defendant's experts' attempt to
distinguish between "setting[s] with institutional characteristics" and
"institutional settings per se."
250
In deciding whether a setting was institutional, the judge looked to
a number of factors: its regimented nature, its control over
individuals' lives, including when and what and where to eat, the
"close quarters entirely with other persons with disabilities," presence
of professional staff who instructed the individuals as to what to do,
lack of privacy, and lack of ability to form friendships or personal
relationships with nondisabled people. 251 The judge also looked to the
absence of opportunities for employment in the community. 252
All of these factors also describe the realities of sheltered
workshops. Sheltered workshops congregate disabled people in close
quarters with each other, staff instruct people as to what to do, and
generally are unable to take individual preferences, talents, or
abilities into consideration in devising the work that people do,
because the work is created by the contracts that the sheltered
workshop negotiates. 253 Sheltered workshops limit and minimize
their abilities to form friendships with non-disabled people, and
reinforce dependence, both because the skills for sheltered workshop
jobs often do not translate into any training useful for the larger
economy, and because they often pay such low wages.
2 54
248. Id.
249. Id. at 199.
250. Id. at 218.
251. Disability Advocates, Inc. v. Paterson (DAI!), 598 F. Supp. 2d 289, 298-99 (E.D.N.Y. 2009).
252. Id.
253. GAO REPORT (2001), supra note 105, at 10.
254. Thomas Simmons & Robert Flexer, Business and Rehabilitation Factors in the Development of
Supported Employment Programs for Adults with Developmental Disabilities, J. REHABILITATION, Jan.-
Mar. 1992, at 35, available at http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m0825/is-n _v58/ai_
12382049/?tag--content,col .. See also GAO REPORT (2001), supra note 105, at 11.
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DAI v. Paterson was the first case that challenged a specific
service setting provided by a Title II entity as segregated and
inappropriate for virtually all of the people it served, rather than
simply trying to move a group of people from a segregated setting to
a community setting. It is true that the challenged service setting was
actually a very small subset of the general service-although
impacted adult homes in New York City with over 120 beds served
about 4300 people, adult homes still serve more than 15,000 mentally
ill people in the state of New York.255 It was not only that the clients
served by impacted adult homes were inappropriately placed there:
adult homes themselves were inappropriately segregated settings.256
Likewise, sheltered workshops are inappropriately segregated
settings.
While adult homes had been criticized as inappropriately
segregated settings for thirty years, 257 the call to end sheltered
workshops is much older. Disabled people themselves first started
criticizing sheltered workshops during the administration of Franklin
Delano Roosevelt.258  Recommendations to abolish sheltered
workshops as segregated settings offering no advantage to disabled
individuals have been made by federal agencies, courts, and disability
professionals for almost forty years. 259 The modem critique of the
sheltered workshop model began with an essay by Jacobus tenBroek,
noted disability scholar, about workshops for people who were blind
in 1960.260 He wrote that sheltered workshops
255. Clifford J. Levy, New York State Fires Operator of 2 Homes for the Mentally Ill, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 9, 2004, at B 1.
256. Id.
257. Disability Advocates, Inc. v. Paterson (DAIII), 653 F. Supp. 2d 184, 197 (E.D.N.Y. 2009).
258. See PAUL LONGMORE, WHY I BURNED MY BOOK, AND OTHER ESSAYS ON DISABILITY 73-75, 83
(2003).
259. See generally J. Buckley & G. Thomas Bellamy, Day and Vocational Programs for Adults with
Severe Disabilities: A National Survey, in ISSUES IN TRANSITION RESEARCH: ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL
OUTCOMES (P. Ferguson ed., 1986); C. Whitehead, Sheltered Workshops in the Decade Ahead: Work,
Wages, and Welfare, in VOCATIONAL REHABILITATION OF SEVERELY HANDICAPPED PERSONS:
CONTEMPORARY SERVICE STRATEGIES 66-92 (G. Thomas Bellamy, Gail O'Connor & Orv C. Karan
eds., 1979); Blanck, Schartz & Schartz, supra note 109, at 1033, 1039; Michael Gill, The Myth of
Transition: Contractualizing Disability in the Sheltered Workshop, 20 DISABILITY & SOC'Y 613 (2005).
260. tenBroek, supra note 15.
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perpetuate a relic of the past: a vague combination of the
workhouse, the almshouse, the factory, and the asylum, carefully
segregated from normal competitive society and administered by
a custodial staff armed with sweeping discretionary authority. In
many cases their responsibility for the client of their services is
so broad as to appear to embrace the function of nearly all other
community agencies and groups .... In their traditional, and still
perhaps their most characteristic, role as permanent employment
outlets for the disabled, the sheltered shops are incompatible with
the purposes and goals of modem vocational rehabilitation....
Because of their customary role as sheltered (i.e., segregated,
covered, and noncompetitive) employment retreats, the social
and psychological environment of the workshops is often not
conducive to the paramount objective of vocational
rehabilitation: that of restoring the disabled person to a
vocational status of normality and equality. 261
tenBroek followed this article with an attack on sheltered
workshops for people with physical disabilities in 1967.262 In the
1970s, as the Independent Living movement came into its own,
supported employment was developed as an alternative to sheltered
workshops. 263 By 1986, the National Council on the Handicapped
condemned sheltered workshops as segregation. 264 The following
year, the court in Homeward Bound v. Hissom ordered the state of
Oklahoma to develop supported and transitional employment options
for plaintiffs in the case. 265 In 1995, a court reviewing the process of
a defendant mental retardation agency toward integration noted that
the agency was in the process of phasing out sheltered workshops.
266
261. Id.
262. Jacobus tenBroek, Sheltered Workshops for the Physically Disabled, 44 J. URB. L. 39 (1967).
263. See SHAPIRO, supra note 32, at 53-55 (1993) (emergence of Center for Independent Living); id.
at 144-45, 147-49, 209 (rejection of sheltered workshops and development of supported employment).
264. NAT'L COUNCIL ON THE HANDICAPPED, TOWARD INDEPENDENCE: AN ASSESSMENT OF FEDERAL
LAWS AND PROGRAMS AFFECTING PERSONS WITH DISABILITiES, at iv (1986).
265. Homeward Bound v. Hissom Mem'l Ctr., No. 85-C-437-E, 1987 WL 27104 (N.D. Okla. July 24,
1987).
266. Ass'n for Retarded Citizens v. Schafer, 872 F. Supp. 689, 706 (D.N.D. 1995).
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In 2002, the State of Vermont closed its last sheltered workshop for
persons with developmental disabilities.267
3. Supported Employment Provides a Far More Integrated Setting
for Vocational Services Than Sheltered Workshops
In addition to the integration mandate, another regulation of the
DOJ provides that nothing in the rule requires an individual with a
disability to accept special accommodations and services provided
under the ADA.268 The DOJ Guidance explicitly states that this
section "was designed to clarify that nothing in the ADA requires
individuals with disabilities to accept special accommodations and
services for individuals with disabilities that may segregate them. 269
The Guidance quotes the House Committee on the Judiciary Report
as to this section as follows:
The Committee added this section [501(d)] to clarify that nothing
in the ADA is intended to permit discriminatory treatment on the
basis of disability, even when such treatment is rendered under
the guise of providing an accommodation, service, aid, or benefit
to the individual with disability. For example, a blind individual
may choose not to avail himself or herself of the right to go to
the front of a line, even if a particular public accommodation 270
has chosen to offer such a modification of a policy for blind
individuals. Or, a blind individual may choose to decline to
participate in a special museum tour that allows person to touch
267. Jennifer Sullivan Silewski, Working Together to Convert the Last Sheltered Workshop in
Vermont to Individualized Supports, INST. FOR COMMUNITY INCLUSION,
http://www.communityinclusion.org/article.php?article id=201 (last visited Mar. 25, 2010).
268. The regulation states that nothing in the ADA shall be construed to "require an individual with a
disability to accept an accommodation, aid, service, or benefit... which such individual chooses not to
accept." 28 C.F.R. 35.130(e)(1) (2009).
269. 28 C.F.R. pt. 35, app. A.
270. Although the Guidance refers to public accommodations, it is found in the DOJ Guidance
pertaining to Title II of the ADA.
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sculptures in an exhibit and instead tour the exhibits at his or her
own pace with the museum's recorded tour. 7'
Thus, Title II agencies may offer segregated services, but they
cannot structure the offer of services in a way that precludes a person
with a disability from refusing those services and requesting more
integrated services. Under the integration mandate, the Title II
agency must offer services in the most integrated setting appropriate
to the needs of the person with the disability and honor the choices of
disabled people to accept those services rather than segregated
services. The question of the role of choice in vocational
rehabilitation has not been given as much attention as it deserves:
proponents of sheltered workshops are often not people with
disabilities, but their parents or the professionals paying for their
care.
2 72
VI. POTENTIAL DEFENSES TO A TITLE II CLAIM CHALLENGING
SHELTERED WORKSHOPS
A. ADA Legislative History Protects Sheltered Workshops
The legislative history of the ADA specifically protects sheltered
workshops, providing that "[t]his legislation in no way is intended to
diminish the continued viability of sheltered workshops and programs
implementing the Javits-Wagner-O'Day Act."273 Immediately after
this language in the House Report, however, is an all-important
caveat:
At the same time, the Committee wishes to reaffirm that
individuals with disabilities cannot be denied the opportunity to
participate in programs that are not separate or different. This is
an important and overarching principle of the Committee's bill.
Separate, special or different programs that are designed to
271. 28 C.F.R. pt. 35, app. A.
272. See generally Migliore et al., supra note 168.
273. S. REPNo. 101-116, at 30,61 (1989); see also H.R. REP. NO. 101-485 (1990).
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provide a benefit to persons with disabilities cannot be used in
any way to restrict the participation of disabled persons in
general, integrated activities.274
The language in the legislative history appears designed to protect
sheltered workshops if people with disabilities choose or prefer
placement in those venues. However, as the language immediately
following the reference to Javits-Wagner-O'Day makes clear, people
with disabilities must have the choice to participate in integrated
vocational services; their "choice" of sheltered workshops cannot be
made on the basis that no other vocational services are available to
them. Therefore, the continued existence of sheltered workshops
should, theoretically, depend on whether they are considered
desirable services by people with disabilities. Research generally
shows that people receiving vocational services in a segregated
environment would greatly prefer to be employed in a mainstream
environment with support.
275
B. Failure to Exhaust Administrative Remedies Under Vocational
Rehabilitation Programs Renders Applicants for Supported
Employment Not Qualified
One of the claims in the case of Messier v. Southbury Training
School involved a challenge to the failure to provide integrated
vocational services-or indeed any vocational services-to residents
of Southbury Training School.2 7 6 This claim, brought against the
Department of Social Services-even though the Bureau of
274. H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. 2 (1990) (emphasis added).
275. Gary R. Bond, Supported Employment: Evidence for an Evidence-Based Practice, 27
PSYCHIATRIC REHABILITATION J. 345, 345-46 (Spring 2004). Tellingly, while the Mississippi
Department of Rehabilitation Services notes that other options (such as sheltered workshops) will
remain available, "However, when given a choice, clients prefer individual placements by an
overwhelming majority." www.mdrs.state.ms.us/Documents/411c42010.doc. See also, Torrey et al.,
supra note 19, (finding that "competitive employment is a major goal of people with severe mental
disorders"); Migliore et al., supra note 168. JR Bedell D. Draving & A. Parrish, et al.,A Description and
Comparison of Experiences of People with Mental Disorders in Supported Employment and Paid
Prevocational Training, 21 PSYCHIATRIC REHABILITATION JOURNAL 279, 283 (1998).
276. Messier v. Southbury Training Sch., No. 3:94-CV-1706(EBB), 1999 WL 20910, at *14 (D.
Conn. Jan. 5, 1999).
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Rehabilitation Services (BRS) was responsible for providing
vocational rehabilitation-failed because the court held that plaintiffs
could not show that they had applied for vocational services, been
turned down, and availed themselves of the appeal process provided
by state statute.277
Despite the fact that plaintiffs proffered a BRS deposition stating
that "BRS likely would not provide vocational services to profoundly
retarded residents incapable of communicating above an eighteen-
month-old level,, 2 78 and demonstrated that no STS resident currently
received any vocational services, 279 the court found that individuals
had to "request or apply for vocational services in order to trigger
BRS' duty to consider the applicant for those services" and plaintiff
had provided no such evidence. 280 Therefore, the court held, plaintiffs
had no standing to assert a claim when they had no proof that they
had suffered an injury in fact. 281
This argument-that plaintiffs must apply for integrated services in
order to have standing to challenge one's relegation to segregated
services-was made by defendants in Disability Advocates, Inc. v.
Paterson and was soundly rejected by the court.282 Under the court's
analysis, adult home residents need only meet the "essential"
eligibility requirements for supported housing: "Not every eligibility
requirement is an 'essential eligibility requirement.' 283 Whether or
not they had applied for supported housing did not matter in terms of
whether they were "qualified" to receive it.284 Tartly noting that most
residents of adult homes had never been informed that they had any
choice about where they lived and were never provided with either
information about housing alternatives or the opportunity to apply for
supported housing, 285 in a subsequent opinion, the court held that
277. Id. at *15.
278. Id.
279. Id.
280. Id. at 20.
281. Id at 15, 21-22.
282. Disability Advocates, Inc. v. Paterson (DAI fl), 653 F.Supp.2d 184, 254-56 (E.D.N.Y. 2009).
283. Id. at 333 (quoting PGA Tour v. Martin, 532 U.S. 661, 688 (2001)).
284. Id. at 333 n.44.
285. Disability Advocates, Inc. v. Paterson (DAIl), 653 F. Supp. 2d 184, 261 (E.D.N.Y. 2009).
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applying for supported housing was not a requirement to show that an
individual was qualified to receive supported housing services.
286
Nor was the plaintiff required to show that each adult home
resident in a large impacted adult home was eligible for supported
housing services. 287 Rejecting this contention, the court noted:
The court does not read Olmstead as creating a requirement that
a plaintiff alleging discrimination under the ADA must present
evidence that he or she has been assessed by a "treatment
provider" and found eligible to be served in a more integrated
setting.
In Joseph S. v. Hogan, 561 F. Supp. 2d 280 (E.D.N.Y. 2008), the
district court found that no eligibility determination from the
"state's mental health professionals" is required, noting that "it is
not clear whether Olmstead even requires a specific
determination by any medical professional that an individual
with mental illness may receive services in a less restrictive
setting, or whether that just happened to be what occurred in
Olmstead." Id. at 291. In Frederick L. v. Department of Public
Welfare, 157 F. Supp. 2d 509 (E.D. Pa. 2001), the district court
declined to read Olmstead as requiring "a formal
'recommendation' for community placement, as that term may
be used in the mental health field," noting that "Olmstead does
not allow States to avoid the integration mandate by failing to
require professionals to make recommendations regarding the
service needs of institutionalized individuals with mental
disabilities." Id. at 540; see also Long v. Benson, No. 08-cv-26
(RH/WCS), 2008 WL 4571904, at *2 (N.D. Fla. Oct. 14, 2008)
(noting that the State "cannot deny the right [to an integrated
setting] simply by refusing to acknowledge that the individual
could receive appropriate care in the community. Otherwise the
right would, or at least could, become wholly illusory."); cf.
Fisher, 335 F.3d at 1181 & n.7 (when there was no dispute as to
286. Id. at 258.
287. Id.
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whether community placement was appropriate, citing the
standard as "when treatment professionals have determined that
community placement is appropriate for disabled individuals");
but see Martin v. Taft, 222 F. Supp. 2d 940, 972 & n.25 (S.D.
Ohio 2002) (requiring plaintiffs to plead "that the state's
professionals have determined the plaintiffs are qualified for
community-based care, or . . . facts from which it may be
inferred that the determinations of the state's professionals are
manifestly unreasonable."). 288
In fact, all that was required for a showing of "otherwise qualified"
was that integrated programs existed in which adult home residents
could be served in a more integrated setting than existed in adult
homes. 289 The court found that adult home residents did not have
more severe disabilities than residents of supported housing,290 and
that there were providers who were willing and able to serve them.29'
Plaintiffs' experts interviewed hundreds of adult home residents and
reviewed the records of hundreds more, and they testified credibly as
to the ability of adult home residents to be served in supported
housing. 29
2
In the case of sheltered workshops, every state in the country
except Vermont has for at least a decade provided some form of
supported employment option for individuals with mental disabilities,
while continuing to fund sheltered workshops.293 It is quite likely that
clients of supported employment are no less disabled than sheltered
workshops, just luckier or more adept at accessing services. Many
people who would be qualified for supported employment services
are deemed ineligible because they cannot prove they have long term
(past eighteen months) supports required by state vocational
rehabilitation agencies; this administrative requirement has nothing to
288. Id. at 258-59.
289. Id. at 191.
290. Id. at 245-47.
291. DAI II, 653 F. Supp. 2d at 247-48.
292. Id. at 257.
293. See STATEDATA, supra note 140. See generally DAVID L. BRADDOCK, THE STATE OF THE
STATES IN DEVELOPMENTAL DISABILITIES (7th ed. 2008).
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do with individuals' ability to succeed in supported employment or
the obligation of state mental retardation and developmental
disability agencies to provide funding for supported employment
services.
C. Fundamental Alteration
When the Supreme Court decided Olmstead, it created a potential
defense for states being asked to serve disabled people in more
integrated settings. If the state could show that it could not
accommodate the plaintiffs' requests to be served in a more
integrated settings without inequities toward the larger population of
people with mental disabilities it served, it could prevail even if
plaintiffs could show that they were being inappropriately
segregated.294
One example the Court in Olmstead gave of how a State could
meet the reasonable modifications standard was "if, for example, the
State were to demonstrate that it had a comprehensive, effectively
working plan for placing qualified persons with mental disabilities in
less restrictive settings, and a waiting list that moved at a reasonable
pace not controlled by the State's endeavors to keep its institutions
fully populated., 295 The plan referred to by the Court quickly became
known as an "Olmstead Plan" and a substantial amount of litigation
has taken place as courts attempt to determine whether the presence
of an Olmstead plan is an absolute defense, and if so, what is required
in such a plan;296 courts have also sought to determine if the absence
of such a plan means that plaintiff prevails.
297
294. Olnstead v. L.C., 527 U.S. 581,603-04 (1999).
295. Id. at 605-06.
296. See Frederick L. v. Dep't of Pub. Welfare (Frederick L. 1), 364 F.3d 487, 497 (3d Cir. 2004);
Frederick L. v. Dep't of Pub. Welfare (Frederick L. fl), 422 F.3d 151, 157 (3d Cir. 2005); Sanchez v.
Johnson, 416 F.3d 1051, 1064-68 (9th Cir. 2005); Williams v. Wasserman, 164 F. Supp. 2d 591, 628
(D. Md. 2001).
297. See Frederick L. I, 364 F.3d at 497; FrederickL. 11, 422 F.3d at 157; Sanchez, 416 F.3d at 1064-
68; Williams, 164 F. Supp. 2d at 628.
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1. What Is the Meaning of an "Olmstead Plan " in the Context of
Vocational Services?
It is not clear how an Olmstead plan would look in the case of
vocational rehabilitation. Presumably, the State would have to
demonstrate that it had created and implemented an efficiently-
operating plan to transition disabled individuals served in sheltered
workshops who qualified for supported employment and desired
supported employment services into such services; in addition, the
State would have to show it did not keep people in sheltered
workshops merely to keep them full.
While the court in DAI v. Paterson held that a State did not have to
have a formal Olmstead plan as a prerequisite for a fundamental
alteration defense, "a state's efforts to comply with the integration
mandate with respect to the population at issue are nonetheless an
important consideration in determining the extent to which the
request for relief would be a permissible 'reasonable accommodation'
or an impermissible 'fundamental alteration.'
298
It is likely that in the case of vocational services, as was the case
with adult homes in DAI v. Paterson, many states will have not have
incorporated vocational services into their Olmstead plan because
they will not have anticipated the need to do so. In many states,
sheltered workshop clients will not have been told that they have any
choice at all about where to receive services; rather, either because
long-term supports are not in place, or because they have medical
problems, personal care issues, or behavioral difficulties, they will
have been screened out of eligibility for supported employment
services.
29930Some states-New Mexico, Vermont, and Washington, °° for
example-have made efforts to expand their supported employment
298. Disability Advocates, Inc. v. Paterson (DA/ 1), 598 F. Supp. 2d 289, 339 (E.D.N.Y. 2009);
Disability Advocates, Inc. v. Paterson (DAIll), 653 F. Supp. 2d 184, 268-69 (E.D.N.Y. 2009).
299. New Mexico's vocational services efforts are part of its compliance with the settlement in
Jackson v. Fort Stanton. See www.jacksoncommunityreview.org. Unfortunately, participation in
supported employment has declined over the last five years. See Metro I Report, 38, available at
www.jacksoncommunityreview.org/2009_MetrolCPRReportDRAFT.pdf, and the Northeast Region
Report, 36, available at www.jacksoncommunityreview.org/2009DRAFFNEROCPR I 1.27.09.pdf.
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services. Other states-Idaho, Missouri, and Nevada, for example-
continue to rely primarily on sheltered workshops. In the absence of
any state efforts to comply with the integration mandate, there can be
no fundamental alteration defense. There are sufficient examples of
states making considerable efforts to provide integrated supported
employment services that if a given state did not have any plan to
move people from sheltered workshops to supported employment, it
should not be able to assert a fundamental alteration defense.
Other States, however, are making efforts to move clients from
sheltered workshops to supported employment: New Mexico, and
Colorado have been working to transition people with developmental
disabilities to supported employment.
Another potential Olmstead plan analysis is the one adopted by
some Ninth Circuit cases: if a state has a supported employment
program which is open to everyone capable of benefiting from it and
which is expanding, both in terms of the number of people served and
the money spent on it, and if the state's sheltered workshop
population is decreasing, then the State may be able to assert an
Olmstead Plan-type defense to a claim against funding sheltered
workshops.30 1 Simply asserting that the State funds some supported
employment programs and believes in the concept of supported
employment is insufficient in any circuit.
30 2
2. What Is the Cost of Supported Employment Compared to
Sheltered Workshops?
The principal argument available to a state in a case asserting the
right of people to receive services in a more integrated setting is that
the cost of such services would inequitably deprive the state's other
300. John Butterworth & Alison Cohen Hall, Innovations in Employment Supports: Washington
State's Division of Developmental Disabilities, INST. FOR COMMUNITY INCLUSION, Aug. 2003,
http://www.communityinclusion.org/article.php?articleid=140; Jean E. Winsor, John Butterworth &
Alison Cohen Hall, Innovations in Employment Supports: Colorado's State Division of Developmental
Services, INST. FOR COMMUNITY INCLUSION, July 2005, http://www.communityinclusion.org/
article.php?article id=160&type--topic&id=4.
301. Arc of Wash. State, Inc. v. Braddock, 427 F.3d 615, 620 (9th Cir. 2005); Sanchez v. Johnson,
416 F.3d 1051, 1067 (9th Cir. 2005).
302. See Frederick L. v. Dep't of Pub. Welfare (FrederickL. 11), 422 F.3d 151 (3d Cir. 2005).
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service recipients of needed services. 30 3 In doing so, the State would
attempt to "show that, in the allocation of available resources,
immediate relief for the plaintiffs would be inequitable, given the
responsibility the State has undertaken for the care and treatment of a
large and diverse population of persons with mental disabilities." 30
4
Thus, the Supreme Court in Olmstead instructed a lower court to
"consider ...the range of services the State provides others with
mental disabilities" prior to ordering injunctive relief.305
As the court noted in DAI v. Patterson, a state asserting a
fundamental alteration defense based on costs must
provide a "specific factual analysis" in order to demonstrate that
the requested relief would constitute a "fundamental alteration."
See, e.g., Fisher, 335 F.3d at 1183 (refusing to accept
fundamental alteration defense absent specific evidence that the
costs of providing the requested relief would "in fact, compel
cutbacks in services to other Medicaid recipients" or be
inequitable to others with disabilities); accord Townsend [v.
Quasim], 328 F.3d [511] at 520 [(9th Cir. 2003)]. 30
The cost defenses have raised a number of questions about how to
measure both the costs to the state and the resources available to the
state, as well as the relevant period of time for the court to analyze in
determining whether any cost constitutes a fundamental alteration. In
DAI II, the court looked to all the resources the state had at its
disposal to serve people with mental illness, across agencies.30 7
Any case involving a comparison between sheltered workshops
and supported employment will raise a number of issues related to
cost. First, to what degree does the effectiveness of outcomes matter
in measuring cost? There seems to be little doubt from the research
303. See Easley v. Snider, 36 F.3d 297, 305 (3d Cir. 1994); Williams v. Wasserman, 937 F. Supp.
524, 531 (D. Md. 1996); Dees v. Austin Travis County Mental Health & Mental Retardation, 860 F.
Supp. 1186, 1190 n.7 (W.D. Tex. 1994).
304. Olmstead v. L.C., 527 U.S. 581, 604 (1999).
305. Id. at 597.
306. Disability Advocates, Inc. v. Paterson (DA1), 598 F. Supp. 2d 289, 335 (E.D.N.Y. 2009).
307. Disability Advocates, Inc. v. Paterson (DA1l), 653 F. Supp. 2d 184, 268-69 (E.D.N.Y. 2009).
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that supported employment is far more effective at securing gainful
competitive employment for its clients, 30 8 even clients with very
serious disabilities, 309 and the clients themselves may be financially
better off with supported employment than sheltered workshops.
Second, the population served matters in assessing cost: people
with autism, for example, are costlier to serve in supported
employment than people with mental retardation.
310
Third, definitions matter: are so-called "enclaves" considered
sheltered employment or supported employment? 311 There are
different models of supported employment.
Fourth, the time period during which the cost-effectiveness is
measured is also extremely important. By its nature, supported
employment is cost-intensive at the front end: when the client is
being interviewed as to his or her desires and preferences, the job is
being located, and support is being initially provided. Theoretically,
supports are supposed to decline over time as the client becomes
familiar with the job. The costs of a sheltered workshop, on the other
hand, are generally fixed.312 One researcher who reviewed twenty-
one cost studies of supported employment concluded that supported
employment programs began to provide a net benefit to the taxpayer
through the taxes paid by disabled individuals in competitive
employment beginning in the fourth year of the supported
308. Justine Schneider, Is Supported Employment Cost-Effective? A Review, 7 INT'L J.
PSYCHOSOCIAL REHABILITATION 145 (2003); G.R. Bond, R.E. Drake, K.T. Mueser & D.R. Becker, An
Update on Supported Employment for People with Mental Illness, 48 PSYCHIATRIC SERVICES 335
(1997).
309. R. Crowther, M. Marshall, G.R. Bond & P. Huxley, Vocational Rehabilitation for People with
Severe Mental Illness, COCHRANE REVIEWS (2002); A.F., Lehman, R. Goldberg, S. McNary, L. Dixon,
L. Postrado & F. Osher, Improving Employment Outcomes for Persons with Schizophrenia and Other
Severe and Persistent Mental Illnesses, 49 SCHIZOPHRENIA RES. 273 (2001) (recounting success of
supported employment in population with high level of psychosis (seventy-five percent) and current
substance abuse (forty percent)).
310. J. Noble, R. Conley, S. Banerjee & S. Goodman, Supported Employment in New York State: A
Comparison of Benefits and Costs, 2 J. DISABILITY POL'Y STUD. 39 (199 1).
311. "Enclaves" are a group of people with disabilities working under the supervision of a non-
disabled individual in a community setting, often providing janitorial services. See LIJTFIYYA, ROGAN &
SHOULTZ, supra note 15.
312. Robert E. Cimera, The Cost-Efficiency of Supported Employment Programs: A Literature
Review, 14 J. VOCATIONAL REHABILITATION 51 (2000).
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employment program. 313 This finding replicated those of earlier
studies.314 In all cases, the benefits of supported employment for
people with milder impairments was significant; the earlier studies
also found that supported employment was consistently less costly
that sheltered work if measured over at least a four-year period.315
Fifth, the utilization or non-utilization of available government
programs to assist people who are receiving supported employment
services is key to measuring costs. Such programs range from
obvious ones such as Home and Community Based Service waiver
payments to PASS (Plan for Achieving Self Support) and IRWE
(Impairment-Related Work Expenses), as well as the Ticket to Work
plan, all of which remain largely underutilized and could be used to
cut costs.
3 16
Finally, to add an even greater degree of complexity, one of the
benefits claimed by advocates of supported employment is that the
increased community integration decreases other costs, such as
hospitalization, by reducing levels of symptoms 317  In DAI v.
Paterson, the court looked at associated costs, finding that the State
paid much more in Medicaid medical benefits for residents of adult
homes than people who lived in supported housing, in part because
the operators of adult homes had financial agreements with health
care providers that operated to the benefit of the adult home operators
and artificially increased medical costs for the residents.318 In some
adult homes, in fact, the operators arranged for unnecessary surgeries
313. Id.
314. W. McCaughrin, W. Ellis, F. Rusch & L. Heal, Cost Effectiveness of Supported Employment, 31
MENTAL RETARDATION 41 (1993); D. Lewis et al., Accounting for Costs of Habilitation Training,
Sheltered Workshops and Supported Employment, 28 EDUC. & TRAINING MENTAL RETARDATION &
DEVELOPMENTAL DISABILITIES 75 (1993); F. Rusch, R. Conley, & W. McCaughrin, Benefit-Cost
Analysis of Supported Employment in Illinois, J. REHABILITATION, Apr.-June, 1993, at 31, available at
1993 WLNR 4771551.
315. Cimera, supra note 312 at 57; McCaughrin et al., supra note 314, at n.310.
316. STATEDATA, supra note 140.
317. Torrey et al., supra note 19; M.D. Bell, R.M. Milstein & P.H. Lysaker, Pay as an Incentive in
Work Participation by Patients with Severe Mental Illness, 44 HOSPITAL & COMMUNITY PSYCHIATRY
684 (1993); K. Sciarappa, E.S. Rogers, K. MacDonald-Wilson & K. Danley, A Benefit-Cost Analysis of
a Supported Employment Model for Persons with Psychiatric Disabilities, 18 EVALUATION & PROGRAM
PLANNING 105 (1995) (quoted in Schneider, supra note 308 (reduced housing costs for people in
supported employment program)).
318. Disability Advocates, Inc. v. Paterson (DA//), 598 F. Supp. 2d 289 (E.D.N.Y. 2009).
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for their residents and pocketed kickbacks from the providers, a
practice that was stopped after DAI brought a lawsuit on behalf of the
residents.319 Rather than comparing housing costs with housing costs,
the court in DAI looked at all costs to the State associated with adult
home residence and supported housing residence, from all parts of
the New York State budget devoted to supporting people with mental
illness. 32 In part, it was this broader conceptualization that enabled




The integration mandate states very clearly its expectation that a
public entity will provide services in the most integrated setting
appropriate to the needs of people with disabilities. Under the ADA,
integrated service is the rule, and segregated service is the exception.
But for people with mental disabilities seeking vocational services,
the norm in many states remains a sheltered and segregated setting
that bears no relationship to how non-disabled people perform actual
work in the real world. Just as adult homes resembled institutions
more than people's homes, sheltered workshops are a vestige of
institutional days. People with disabilities do not need to be sheltered
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